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This work examines the role of indeterminacy and otherness in the totality of what is 
here described as Aristotelian Science. Relying on the Aristotelian opposition 
between the static, changeless one of Parmenides and the dynamic flux of Heraclitus, 
Aristotle's simultaneous foundation of change and knowledge is discussed, and it is 
argued that Aristotle uses certain limited conceptions of otherness and indeterminacy 
within his scientific system as a means of guaranteeing change without thereby 
undermining the determinacy of being required for knowledge. The author's 
contention is that Aristotle limits the otherness and indeterminacy found in his work, 
and in so doing, falls into a kind of monism with respect to the totality of order and 
rationality, the unity present in all beings and the exclusion of the other from the 
system. The proof of this occurs through both rational and empirical arguments. 
Examinations of Aristotelian theory, and theory of science, as well as minute analyses 
of Aristotle's 'indeterminate' conceptions of matter, potential, the accidental, the 
other, monstrosity and infinity, show that there is in fact no real otherness in 
Aristotle's work, and that this is necessary for the possibility of his conception of 
science. But the loss of this otherness, and the consequent subsumption of everything 
into an ordered sphere, leaves Aristotle in a sort of metaphysical monism. The 
emphasis here is overwhelmingly on the Aristotelian text. 
v 
INTRODUCTION 
"And swift, past understanding swift, the splendor of the earth whirls past" (Gabriel, 
Faust l, 1). 
"The history of madness would be the history of the Other--of that which for a given 
culture is at once interior and foreign, therefore to be excluded (so as to exorcise the 
interior danger) but by being shut away (in order fo reduce its otherness); whereas the 
history of the order imposed on things would be the history of the Same--of that 
which, for a given culture, is both dispersed and related, therefore to be distinguished 
by kinds and to be collected together into identities. And if one considers that disease 
is at one and the same time disorder--the existence of a perilous otherness within the 
human body, at the very heart of life--and a natural phenomenon, with its own 
constants, resemblances and types .... From the limit-experience of the Other ... 
It was upon this threshold that the strange figure of knowledge called man first 
appeared and revealed a space proper to the human sciences" (The Order of Things, 
Michel Foucault, xxiv). 
For Aristotle, indeterminacy and otherness present the most radical challenge to 
knowledge. Unrestrained they would destroy all knowledge, abolishing unity, 
identity, opposition and the limit. For this reason, Aristotle is obsessed with them 
and they appear constantly in his work in their many forms--positively, in potentiality, 
chance, change, matter, the accidental, the monstrous, the infinite, the many and the 
other; negatively, in discourse, the actual, determinacy, the limit and the one. 
Aristotle's problematic, originally framed by Plato, opposes the unity and static nature 
of the Parmenidean/Melissean ontology with the indeterminacy and radical otherness--
or absence of non-contradictory identity--of the Cratylean/Heraclitean ontology. Like 
Plato, Aristotle argues for a reconciliation of the binary opposition by melding the 
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unity of the Parmenidean solution with the plurality and otherness of the Heraclitean, 
through a separation (in this case, formal) between the spheres of appearance and 
reality. Instead of ignoring the possibility of indeterminacy and otherness, like many 
modem philosophers, and thereby allowing them to subvert the completeness of his 
system, Aristotle attempts to co-opt them by including them within his universal 
system. Hence, in allowing the existence of otherness and indeterminacy, he is careful 
to insure that their appearance will take some knowable form, for although 
indeterminacy and otherness may be said in many senses, they are not said, and 
perhaps cannot be said, in an unqualified sense. By consigning them to the realm of 
the inessential, and, then, placing limits on them even within this sphere, Aristotle is 
able to provide an alternative to the either/or of the Parmenidean/Heraclitean 
opposition, and to the Platonic theory of forms, allowing for change, while at the 
same time retaining the possibility of knowledge of things in the world, that is, 
retaining the ontological order and systematicity of Aristotelian science. But 
Aristotle's solution involves the limitation of indeterminacy and otherness to the point 
of changing their very essence. Though a very restricted notion of otherness is 
necessary for his scientific system, in order for there to be change, the logic of 
Aristotelian science is incompatible with the possibility of any real indeterminacy or 
otherness, for they are of a nature to undermine system and the entire ordered 
framework on which it is based. Thus, Aristotle conceives of them in such a way as 
to make possible their inclusion within the totality of his scientific system of causal 
explanations, and in so doing Aristotle falls prey to a certain monism that excludes 
radical otherness completely. This is not to say that he fully rationalizes and delimits 
all of the indeterminacy and radical otherness that he finds in his system. However, 
that which remains is traceable not to his willingness to permit indeterminacy, but 
rather to his failure or unwillingness to account for the totality of relations (causes) 
within the universe via a grand plan or a theory of natural laws. 
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CHAPTER ONE--OTHERNESS AND INDETERMINACY 
The role and meaning of otherness and indeterminacy in Aristotle cannot 
be understood in isolation from their purpose within his scientific system. 
Indeterminacy and otherness are concepts which, prior to Aristotle, seemed 
purely destructive of rational knowledge, for they corrode the limit, and with it, 
the unity, totality, distinct identity and difference, and temporal and physical 
continuity necessary for universal, eternal, continuous knowledge. This is not to 
say that they are incompatible with all conceptions of knowledge. Attempts were 
made, for instance, to link the Heraclitean ontology with a Protagorean 
epistemology, in the Theaetetus, but these concerned a radically different 
conception of knowledge. Knowledge, conceived as objective and universal, as 
in Plato and Aristotle, becomes possible only if otherness and indeterminacy are 
excluded entirely from the system, limited, or situated within an inessential or 
superficial realm of being, for untamed they destroy all constancy, self-identity, 
unity, opposition and limit. Hence, the place of indeterminacy and otherness in 
the ontologies of Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle, 
among others, is seen as crucial to their epistemologies. 
As always, we must begin again, in our discussion of indeterminacy and 
otherness, with the oft-posited opposition between the dynamic system of Heraclitus 
and the static system of Parmenides. In the Heraclitean system, indeterminacy and 
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otherness are ever-present in the sensible world, though possibly excluded from the 
deeper logos of the system; in the Parmenidean system, they are excluded completely, 
but indeterminacy is retained in a sense, for the exclusion of otherness entails the 
exclusion of all division, limit and identity. Hence, in both cases the (non-)presence 
of indeterminacy and otherness on the level of being is thought to make knowledge of 
things in the world impossible, for if being is indeterminate, then it cannot be 
inquired into. Aristotle's solution is a synthesis of the two approaches. In order to 
lay the world open for scientific knowledge, he includes indeterminacy and otherness 
within the totality of his system, but he does so by giving form, unity, limit and order 
to their unlimited, indefinable nature. Their new form is limited, and their purpose is 
to provide a response to the pre-Socratic ideas of flux and unity. 
The Heraclitean idea of the world first illustrates the problem of change with 
respect to scientific knowledge. According to the standard view of Heraclitus, his 
account subverts the possibility of knowledge. The tradition has him say that 
everything is in flux, that there is no constant referent, no measured unity to this 
world of appearances, and, though he hints at a deep logos lying beneath the surface 
and unifying everything, Plato and Aristotle find his account destructive of all 
knowledge, as long as this shifting world of appearances is conceived as the only 
reality. For Protagoras, this account of existence is not incompatible with knowledge, 
though surely knowledge of quite an odd sort, but the intelligibility of such an attempt 
is not broadly acknowledged. Thus, Plato, in the Theaetetus, represents the tradition 
ably in this matter when he dismisses the Protagorean attempts to base an 
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epistemology on the Heraclitean ontology, and argues that no epistemology can be 
supported by an account of being as constantly in flux. For Plato and Aristotle, 
Heraclitus' account asserts that the objects of experience are without lasting identity, 
limit or border--shapeless, indeterminate and ungraspable. Aristotle ascribes to 
Heraclitus the view "that all that is has its being essentially in movement" or in 
"ceaseless flux" (405a27). In Ovid's formulation, "omnia mutantur; omniafluunt; 
quod faimus aut sumus, eras non erimus. " All things change; all things flow; what we 
were or are, tomorrow we will not be. This idea that the world is in continual change 
gives free rein to indeterminacy, overthrowing the inviolable law of non-contradiction 
(Metaph. IV.6, 101 la16-b23; XI.5, 1061b34-1062b10)--in claiming that 
contradictories are at the same time true of the same thing--and removing the 
underlying basis for definition--the stable essence. The defined is the changeless, and, 
if everything is changing, then nothing can be defined. By removing the possibility of 
real limitation that is not overflowed by change, at least in the sensible world, 
Heraclitus precludes all identification and contradiction, according to Aristotle. His 
conception that opposite statements are true of the same things means that no 
predication whatsoever is possible, for it predicates everything of everything (Physics, 
185b20), and this "utterly destroy[s] rational discourse" (Metaph.XI.5,1062bl0). The 
Heraclitean form of change is unlimited, at least with regard to the sensible world; it 
extends to all things, whether necessary or contingent, mixing them together and 
obscuring their qualities. For Heraclitus, one can never step into the same river twice 
(1010a14), and Cratylus, extending this remark, claims that one cannot even do it 
7 
once (1010al4). The Heraclitean conception of continual essential change makes this 
impossible, because it obviates the possibility of even defining the river as a 'this', as 
a particular thing. In the raging diversity of appearances, the possibility of the 
separation and opposition required for identity is mooted, and all is mixed together, in 
Anaxagorean fashion, and indistinguishable. "[A]s <one and> the same thing, there 
is present < in us? > living and dead and the waking and the sleeping and young and 
old. For the latter, having changed around, are the former, and the former, having 
changed around, are <back> again <to being> the latter" (Heraclitus, frag. 88, 
p.53). The meaning of such statements, however, may not be that which has been 
asserted by the tradition. To begin with, the celebrated panta rei--the claim that all is 
in flux--is not among the authenticated fragments ("Heraclitus and Parmenides," Jean 
Beaufret, in Heidegger on Heraclitus, p. 71). In the fragments, Heraclitus asserts the 
existence of a logos or a measure beneath this world of ceaseless change, and "the 
immutability of the measures which never stop ruling is more radical than the 
movement or change" (ibid.). This is certainly not the traditional view of Heraclitus. 
And yet, this conception is not easily assimilable to traditional views of knowledge, 
for its God is polemos, ceaseless conflict, a god constantly undergoing alteration, like 
fire (ibid., p. 72, fragment 85), and its unity is one in which the measure "is the same 
and the other at the same time, in the bosom of a unity where difference constantly 
breaks through" (ibid., p. 71). This being said, whether we assume the traditional 
view of Heraclitus, or base our view strictly on the fragments, the Heraclitean 
conception of the world as indeterminacy and radical otherness, if extended to all 
being, destroys the possibility of a traditional conception of knowledge, for it 
imagines a world constantly becoming other to 'itself', mixed together with all else--
its identity being nothing but radical otherness--indeterminate and without bounds. 
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What remains falls far short of the requirements for knowledge, at least by 
Aristotle's standard. For something to be an object of knowledge or thought it must 
be unchanging, or at least admit of a rational causal explanation depicting the basis, 
mode, and end towards which it changes. "[E]very definition and every science is of 
universals" (Metaph.XI.4, 1059b25), and if no constant universals remain, there is no 
knowledge. Hence, Aristotle argues that one can have "no knowledge of things in a 
state of flux" (Metaph.XIII.4, 1078bl6-18). If Heraclitus is right and everything is in 
flux, then there is no knowledge of things in the world. The 'foundation' of this 
indeterminacy is otherness, or the absence of unity or presence. Heraclitus seemed to 
deny the existence of all unity in the world; for him there was thought to be only 
otherness and difference--there are many, but no One. Or, rather, "all is one," which 
is to say the same thing, for the constant flux obviates the possibility of identity, and 
thus of differentiating between things (Heraclitus, fragment 50, "panta einai"). Thus, 
sheer indeterminacy and radical otherness are characteristic of the Heraclitean 
paradigm. But this view is completely incompatible with Aristotle's vision of the 
world, for his purpose is not to undermine knowledge, but to exhibit its content and 
grounds. 
Aristotle's goal is scientific; he explains things and events in the world via an 
account of their causes and essences. Scientific knowledge is attained through· 
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acquaintance with objects of inquiry that "have principles, conditions, or elements" 
(Phys. l84al). Science requires the unity and order of originary conditions. It is the 
knowledge, or episteme, of the constant order of causes of being. "[W]e think we 
know, only when we have ascertained the causes" (Metaph.II.2, 994b29), that is the 
material, formal, efficient and final causes. This notion of a rationality existing 
within the world, and rationally unifying all change, requires precisely that this 
change occur according to fixed, limited rules, with a basic unity (the order and 
rationality of nature and art, and the substratum) underlying the differences seen in 
change. As a result, Aristotle cannot accept an account of the world as indeterminate 
and radically other, even in some of its aspects, for this would unravel the 
universality and continuity of the network of causes. Indeterminacy and otherness in 
this radical form are simply not part of his system, and rightly so, for it is their 
nature to defy the totality and completeness of system. They are Protean; they elude 
the attempts of mind to grasp and unify them, to give them form and limits. The 
basic opposition between the timeless, unchanging universals of knowledge and the 
indeterminacy of constantly changing things in the world has for this reason been the 
theme of philosophy from Plato and the pre-Socratics to the present. Seeking to 
break through the ever-changing appearances of the sensible world, Faust laments, 
"[e]ternal nature, where shall I grasp you?" (Faust I, 13). For Cratylus, essences or 
eternal nature cannot be grasped at all, for being is indeterminate, and this 
indeterminacy precludes the possibility of knowledge. The apparent indeterminacy of 
the sensible world seems to rule out the possibility of science. To overcome this 
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problem, a scientific system has to account for change, while at the same time 
demonstrating the existence of an ontological sphere in which being is sheltered from 
this indeterminacy and radical otherness. But while the alternative system entirely 
accounts for indeterminacy and otherness, by excluding them, it does so at the cost of 
excluding the possibility of change. Heraclitus' position would seem, then, to hold 
some common-sense attraction for a scientist like Aristotle, who seeks rational 
explanations for the changes observed in nature, because it at least admits that there is 
change. Change must be accounted for, and not as something extraneous or 
accidental, as in some of the followers of Parmenides, but as something fundamental 
to the nature (physis) of things, for Aristotle argues that "it is characteristic of matter 
to suffer action, i.e. to be moved" (de Gen. et Corr., 336b30). Heraclitus, then, who 
determines change and strife as essential characteristics of being, is able to allow for 
change and the otherness that makes it possible. 
But Aristotle offers the pluralist Heraclitus and his followers only invective and 
ridicule. Heraclitus asserts that all things change, but then can say nothing about it. 
Having failed to limit indeterminacy in the world of appearances, he seems, to 
Aristotle and Plato, to destroy the possibility of knowledge, as long as that is equated 
with the knowledge of sensibles. For Plato, it is questionable whether there is any 
practical knowledge; his questions seek after the essences of things and dismiss the 
importance and wisdom of worldly actions and change. But for Aristotle, knowledge 
of the relations governing the sensible world is essential. His disregard for 
Heraclitus, then, is caused by his perception that Heraclitus' view makes knowledge 
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of the sensible world impossible. Heraclitus' doctrine prevents him from resolving 
the oppositions and continual conflict of this world, or of saying anything positive, in 
the fragments, about the state of nature--except that it changes and that there is an 
underlying logos to this change--that change is measured (Heraclitus, frag.31b) and 
that "all things happen in accordance with this account" (ibid., fragment 1, p.11)--and 
he is unable or unwilling to provide a workable definition of change. 
Paradoxically, it is Parmenides, with his notions of unity and a static universe, 
who provides Aristotle with a notion of change--to become other. But he also says 
that being is one, that "all things that are are one and this is being" 
(Metaph. l00la35). This means that there is no otherness, for all things are one, and 
consequently, there is no change. "One and unchanging is that for which as a whole 
the name is: 'to be"' (fragment 20). Whether this means that Parmenides recognizes 
the appearance of mobility and argues that it is only an appearance, or that 
Parmenides believes that the mobility of things does not rule out the immobility of the 
whole--as in Lukacsian realism--remains in question. According to Beaufret, "[a]t 
bottom there is probably as little immobilism in the poem of Parmenides as there is 
mobilism in the fragments of Heraclitus. . . . we find permanence and change in both 
Heraclitus and Parmenides" (Heidegger on Heraclitus, p.85). Nonetheless, the 
problematic, for Aristotle, concerns such a duality between the permanence of 
Parmenides and the change of Heraclitus. Other monists, rephrasing the problematic, 
soften the Parmenidean picture--or do more justice to it--and come somewhat closer to 
Aristotle's position, arguing that there is no change other than alteration, for "the 
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underlying something always remains identical and one" (de Gen. et Corr.314b2). 
The basic argument, however, of a monistic view is that the otherness of change is 
impossible. To become other (whether at all or in the underlying substratum) is 
impossible within the realm of being, if being is one, for to become other would be to 
become other to being. This is to pass into non-being. To change from A to B, then, 
would require that A be destroyed and become non-being. B would not be generated 
from A, but from nothing. This, however, is manifestly absurd. Nothing can come 
from what is not. Hence, Parmenides argues that there is no change at all. He 
asserts that "it is changeless . . . remaining the same and in the same state . . . 
perpetually" (fragment 8, 26-30). For Aristotle this assertion is obviously wrong. He 
looks to the world, sees change, and terms this an essential property of matter, and so 
he is naturally dissatisfied with Parmenides' account, for the latter does not only deny 
the possibility of change, but he also excludes the possibility of all predication and 
knowledge by denying the possibility of otherness. According to Parmenides, it "is 
immovable and complete ... Nor is it divisible, since it all alike is" (fragment 8c). 
In the absence of the differentiation and combination that is made possible by 
otherness, there can be no knowledge, as Plato understands in the Sophist (252). 
Truth and discourse would be impossible "if we had yielded the point that there is no 
blending of any form with one another" (Sophist, 260b). But division is also 
necessary, for without it there would be no otherness, and it would be impossible to 
separate one from an other. Difference must be present in being, for "[i]f it does not 
blend with them, everything must be true, but if it does, we shall have false thinking 
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and discourse" (Sophist, 260c). Without otherness, "[o]ne path only is left for us to 
speak of: that it is ... for it is not to be said or thought that it is not" (Parmenides, 
fragment 8a). Nothing can be predicated of beings if there is only the one and nothing 
can be predicated of that which is not being, for "[o]ne cannot legitimately utter the 
words, or speak or think of that which just simply is not; it is unthinkable, not to be 
spoken of or uttered or expressed" (Sophist, 238c). Unlimited otherness destroys all 
knowledge, but so does the absence of otherness. 
Aristotle, assuming the existence of both change and knowledge, would argue 
that Parmenides fails in two respects: he fails the empirical test--for experience shows 
that there is change--and he fails to account for the knowledge that actually exists. His 
problem is essentially that he ignores otherness, a problem which Aristotle believes he 
has overcome with his equivocations in the senses of being and his separation between 
the individual and the universal. By asserting that being is one, Parmenides is forced 
to conclude that otherness is non-being. Monism is not itself a unified 'movement', 
finding its unity in various realms, though it does have the common denominator of 
finding a oneness pervading the universe in some way, eliminating the possibility of 
an otherness beyond unity. The diversity of these monisms should be recognized, 
however, in preparation for the characterization of Aristotle as a monist. The 
Parmenidean monism is one of the definition, for "Parmenides seems to fasten on that 
which is one in definition," while Melissus fastens "on that which is one in matter" 
(Metaph.1.5, 986bl8). In either case, such a monistic explanation of being has to 
deny the evidence of the senses that there is change, that the universe is dynamic. But 
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the alternative, a pluralistic system like that of Heraclitus, fails to explain knowledge, 
for it lacks the unity, stability and the limit provided by a natural order characterized 
by both unity and difference, and division and combination. Both positions deny the 
possibility of knowledge of the sensible, but the opposition is normally imagined as an 
either/or between intelligibility and change. Parmenides and Heraclitus present us 
with a dilemma: "either change or intelligibility, but not both" (Veatch, 28). The 
solution, for Aristotle as for Plato, is in a golden mean between the two accounts. 
There is change, Aristotle concludes, but an explanation of it cannot turn on a 
situation in which there are no verities, no forms (in the world) unaffected by change. 
The things of the world must not be merely individuals, but must also be ordered by 
universal rational ends, and causes that always have the same result. A thing must 
have this universal, rational unchanging essence or substance in the world if there is 
to be knowledge, for "[i]f there is nothing apart from individuals, there will be no 
object of thought, but all things will be objects of sense, and there will not be 
knowledge of anything" (Metaph.999b2-4). A constant measure--a universal free of 
the indeterminacy of this world--must be present in sensible things if there is to be 
knowledge, and this requires that there be something distinct from this changing 
world of individuals. It requires a separation between the particular individuals of 
this world and universals, for there is no knowledge of individuals per se. Knowledge 
is of the universal, which involves explanation; "[t]he universal is more knowable in 
the order of explanation, the particular in the order of sense; for explanation has to do 
with the universal, sense with the particular" (Phys.189a5). By conceiving, like 
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Plato, of a separation, in this case formal, between appearances and reality, Aristotle 
allows for change without disqualifying the determinacy and unity required for 
knowledge. This accurately addresses the problem, for a scientific explanation of 
being must account for change and otherness and yet retain the essential stability and 
unity necessary for knowledge. 
The scientific solution to the problems raised by Heraclitus and Parmenides 
turns on the question of indeterminacy and otherness. If unlimited, they undermine 
the possibility of the order required for knowledge; if excluded, they make change 
impossible. The order of knowledge is founded on the order of being. If being is 
indeterminate, a realm of radical otherness, then it cannot stand as the basis for an 
ordered knowledge. And this applies to any true indeterminacy and otherness, for 
any disruption of the ordered relations of the system impacts upon them all in that 
they are all connected together somehow. "For as it belongs in all cases to one and 
the same science to deal with correlated subjects . . . it follows that natural science 
will have to include the whole universe in its province" (Parts of Animals, 641b1). 
Science must be able to have a totality of explanations if it is to have any, for 
indeterminacy or radical otherness within a single case overflows the borders of the 
determined, spreading to related cases and undermining the entire causal network, 
even bringing into question the unity and order of nature. Nor can the unlimited be 
present within the causal network, in the form of an infinite series, for those who 
allow such a series "destroy science; for it is not possible to have this till one comes 
to the unanalyzable terms. And knowledge becomes impossible" (Metaph.11.2, 
994b21). Hence, indeterminacy and otherness must be limited in their nature or 
excluded from the realm that is considered true being, if there is to be knowledge. 
Aristotle, Plato and Heraclitus all take this approach. 
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Science, for Aristotle, is ordered knowledge of ordered being [here I am not 
equating all being with a single hypostatized Parmenidean being]; hence, science 
requires an ontological basis for the order seen in change. This order must not be 
merely a product of the mind's rationalizing of being--it must not be the product of a 
logos situated in the observer but not in the observed; the order must be present on 
the level of being. Hence, Aristotle's view should not be reduced to a linguistic 
perspectivism, which views the mind's logos as the source of the order observed in 
science. Aristotle, as a scientist, believes that the order is in being, arguing that 
"there is an Order controlling all things" (de Gen. 336bl2). He seeks not to give 
order to the things, but, as Heidegger and Owens have observed, to allow the order 
of knowledge to mirror the order present on the level of beings, to let the beingness 
of things shine forth (phainesthai) and reveal itself (a-letheia), to allow beings to let 
themselves be known (Owens, 62-3). The prerequisite of truth for Aristotle, as for 
Plato in the Sophist, is the ordered combination and separation of being, the division 
of the one (the primal ousia to which all being refers) into many and the combination 
of the many into one, and although both are necessary, the one has the priority, for 
science requires identity. "For Aristotle it is the opposites, as constituents of our 
differentiated world, which have actual existence, while the primeval One from which 
they once emerged, is essentially their 'not yet' or potentiality, and from this point of 
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view it makes little difference whether it be material substrate, migma or apeiron" 
(Seligman, 46). Phenomenally, we are given not the prime matter--the one--which 
does not admit of the measure or the limit, but the opposites that arise from the 
potentiality of the one to be separated and combined, as in the logos apophantikos. 
The presence of this inherent oppositionality--as opposed to a strict continuity without 
limit in being--makes knowledge and truth possible. Truth "depends, on the side of 
the objects, on their being combined or separated, so that he who thinks the separated 
to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose 
thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects is in error" (Metaph. IX.10, 
1051bl). "And truth means knowing these objects" (1052a2). Knowledge depends 
on the order of the objects, not on the nature of the perceiver. 
The way in which these objects change must also be ordered, according to 
rational nature--the internal and external causes of change must be ordered and 
teleological. Hence, Aristotle argues that the rational nature is expressed in the 
external relations between things and in the internal movements of things. 
"[E]verything that Nature makes is means to an end. For just as human creations are 
the products of art, so living objects are manifestly the products of an analogous 
cause or principle, not external but internal, derived like the hot and the cold from the 
environing universe" (Parts of Animals, 64lbll). The end or final cause is the 
reason present in the thing, and the determination of this reason is the goal for 
science, whether in art or nature, for "the reason forms the starting point, alike in the 
works of art and in works of nature" (PA, 639bl4). This "order and definiteriess" is 
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more obvious in the celestial bodies than in changing perishable bodies here on earth, 
whose motions seem to be governed by chance and spontaneity, but a definite order 
governs in both the static celestial bodies and the dynamic sensible things (64lb18). 
This is not to attribute pure necessity to everything. Indeed, we must not be too hasty 
in dismissing the role of chance and otherness, and attributing an ordered pattern to 
everything, for Aristotle denied determinism (Preus, 191, cf.Int. 9) and argued that 
"there is contingency even apart from human action" (Ross, 80). However, this 
contingency is not incompatible with science. 
Scientific investigation is of the necessary, and it depends on the determinacy 
of the totality, and so this realm of contingency appears to constitute an exception to 
this totality, undermining all explanation. But the relations by which all things 
change are determinable by scientific investigation, because this order admits of 
relative, or hypothetical, and strict necessity, both of which are in keeping with the 
causal explanation of events. The order of objects must be necessary, for "the object 
of scientific knowledge is of necessity" (Nie.Ethics, 1139b22), whether this be the 
absolute necessity of eternal nature or the hypothetical necessity of other parts of 
nature (Ross, 78). The method of science requires necessary objects, but this 
necessity need not be in the strict sense. We must show that respiration, for instance, 
takes place with a certain final object, "and that part of the process is necessitated by 
this and that other stage of it" (PA, 642a31). But this necessity admits of a rather 
extended definition. "By necessity we shall sometimes mean hypothetical necessity, 
the necessity, that is, that the requisite antecedents shall be there, if the final ehd is to 
be reached" and sometimes the absolute necessity connecting substances (642a33). 
Absolute necessity concerns eternal phenomena, but natural and artificial things also 
admit of a certain necessity, because they are the product of a rational order. 
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"[T]here is hypothetical necessity manifested in everything that is generated by nature 
as in everything that is produced by art, be it a house or what may" (639b24). 
Underlying both is the natural order, the way in which things naturally occur 
according to definite reasons, given a certain set of antecedent circumstances. This 
natural order underlies the necessity of substantial relations as well as the hypothetical 
necessity of events thought to occur accidentally. Thus, Aristotle meets the 
requirements for science by arguing that the needed order is in fact present, and that 
it extends beyond the essences, or necessary ends and objects of things, to accidental 
events. The object of science is the examination of the necessary, the essential, and 
this is manifested in the four causes, but the extension of necessity to the hypothetical 
necessity of nature means that science can also examine that which does not happen 
always or for the most part--the accidental--because the rational order underlies both 
absolutely and hypothetically necessary acts. This rationality is apparent in the 
necessity of the sequential relations connecting given events and in the universality of 
the formal and final causes. The primary object of science, the essential, is manifest 
in the changeless formula--the substance of a thing (in the limited sense of substance)-
-and is equivalent to the formal and final causes, for "[t]he formal and at the same 
time the final cause is 'the formula expressing the essential nature' of the things that 
come to be" (Ross, 107). As Aristotle says, "the form or the archetype [is] the 
20 
statement of the essence, and its genera" (Phys.194b27). And this means that 
substance in the sense of the formula is identical to essence. But this is the object of 
science, "a rational formula" (Meta.1046b7). The foundation of science, then, must 
come from the essential order and rationality of being. 
Being, for Aristotle, is essentially ordered--" all things are ordered together 
somehow" (1075a16)--and this order and reason, which provide the ontological basis 
for science, is manifested in the essences. In other words, there is a reason in things. 
Being itself is ordered; it "falls immediately into genera" (1004a5). Hence, Aristotle 
approves of Anaxagoras' idea that "reason [is] present--as in animals, so throughout 
nature--as the cause of order and of all arrangement" (984bl4-16). Reason [logos] is 
present throughout nature, although it is not necessarily present in everything, for the 
lower elements, as individuals, may behave randomly while the whole is rational 
(1075a23). 
This appearance of randomness cannot, however, be characteristic of the basic 
structure, for a scientific account of the world can allow no unexplainable 
indeterminacy and otherness into the system, and Aristotle eventually explains away 
this indeterminacy. Science, in the traditional sense, requires that something be in a 
steady state, that there be constant rules by which to organize the past and inductively 
predict the future, whether it be the laws of the relations between things, as in pre-
quantum science, or the essences of the things in Aristotelian science. This does not 
entail the absence of 'creative' premises and principles, which are not themselves 
proved, or new rules, but it does require a certain unity and oppositional identity. 
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There must be division and classification--in short, a rational order. Aristotle's 
specific project of science, at least as described in the Posterior Analytics, is proof, or 
demonstration, and the drawing of borders or limits, i.e. definition. As Novak's title 
claims, Aristotle's method is definition and demonstration. Hence, his view of 
science extends beyond strict demonstration, even to those things that happen for the 
most part (Leszl, 64). Because being is ordered, and thus already limited and 
distinguished, a certain ontological foundation exists already for the second function 
of science--definition (logos, horismos, horos (Novak, 21)). The prior determinacy of 
being allows the assumption, not the proof, of definitions, and this is necessary for 
science, for one needs to start somewhere. "A science, on Aristotle's account, 
assumes the definition of its terms" and proves the rest (Leszl, 66). Scientific 
knowledge is attained by acquaintance with the "principles, conditions, or elements" 
of objects of an inquiry (Phys. l84a9-l0). It requires knowledge of the "primary 
conditions or first principles" (184a13). These vary, but there are commonalities that 
run through the sciences. "Though each science is distinct and has its own principles 
or starting points, there are certain principles which are common to all the sciences," 
the axioms (axiomata, Post.An. 77a26) and the common principles (koinai archai, 
88b28) (Novak, 4). These axioms have a metaphysical justification, for they "are 
presupposed by any scientific knowing," and only metaphysics, "which does not have 
the restricted scope of the particular sciences (Metaph., XI, 4)," can justify these 
overarching axioms (Novak, 4-5--the words are Novak's, the reference is in his text). 
The scientific method, then, has certain metaphysical justifications, and these allow it 
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to overflow the limits of the regional sciences. But the specific principles of each 
science have an ontological basis; they are of the order of things, for "the existence 
of different principles depends on the existence of different genera" (Leszl, 72). 
Different genera demand different principles, for they do not have a unity, and so it 
was thought that there was no science that overflowed the boundaries of this unity, no 
universal science that concerned all genera (Leszl, 71). "[N] atural science, like other 
sciences, is in fact about one class of being," (Meta. l025bl9) not about all classes at 
once--though universal mathematics "applies alike to all" (1026a27). And yet within 
each of these realms, there is a unity, and this unity overflows the somewhat arbitrary 
borders between disciplines, taking the entire universe for its object (64lbl). Science 
is based on a unity, a basic order, and so each science concerns a single genus, a 
single class of things identical in one particular respect. "A genus is what ultimately 
distinguishes one science from another" (Novak, 4). 
If no universal science exists, then, it is because no unity obtains between 
genera--genera are radically other to each other--and so it is "a condition of scientific 
knowledge 
... that all the terms conform in some way to one definition" (Leszl, 83). In other 
words, as befits Aristotle's supposedly empiricist methodology, each science must be 
directed specifically to the nature of the inquiry and the subject matter, and since a 
unity does not inhere between genera, each science will be limited to a specific region 
of being. There will not be an overarching science that sweeps through all categories 
of being, and thus there will not be, it seems, any view of Science in general in 
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Aristotle, such as the one described in these pages. Such a metaphysical conception 
of science would contradict Aristotle's empirical method. For this reason, according 
to a conventional view, Aristotle did not leave us a tractatus on science, but merely 
separate works within the narrow fields of the various sciences. 
And yet Aristotle invests his account(s) of science with a certain univocity 
throughout his work that cannot be explained away. In many places, his accounts of 
science are not delimited, but speak of science in general, and this is clear even 
within his argument that science requires a unity, and that it therefore cannot extend 
beyond a given genus, for this argument still relies on a certain view of all of the 
sciences. A unity is required in all the sciences, for "the one ... is the beginning 
of the knowable regarding each class," even though the one is not the same in every 
class (1016b20). Every science also shares certain rational needs. "[I]n general 
every science which is ratiocinative or at all involves reasoning deals with causes and 
principles, more or less precise" (1025b5). While these sciences admit of regional 
limits, they do have similar requirements and goals, and the same sorts of theoretical 
investigation are involved in the universal science of first philosophy, but without the 
regional limits. Moreover, Aristotle subverts the finality of the limitation of each 
science to a specific genus by arguing that genera are, to a certain extent, hypothetical 
constructions. Any given thing, examined in different ways, may be assigned to any 
number of genera. Hence, certain interconnections are thought to exceed the limits of 
genera, grounding the possibility of a science of being qua being (Leszl, 80), and this 
implies that a certain unity pervades all of being. Insofar as the sciences all require 
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such an identity in their respective fields, the existence of this unity--in addition to the 
common rationality of the various fields--grounds the possibility of a universal 
conception of science. For these reasons, Novak can speak with some justification of 
"the Aristotelian scientific enterprise" (Novak, 192). This is apparent also from his 
critical examination of the limits of science. Aristotle's negative treatment of science 
in general manifests the univocity of the general aspects of the various sciences, as in 
his argument "that there can be no scientific treatment of" the accidental (1026b4). 
Though he confirms this 'empirically' by pointing to the 'fact' that no science--
whether practical, productive or theoretical--deals with the accidental (1026b5), he 
also does so by rational argument--by examining the 'nature' of the accidental in 
general (1026b21--"this is clear also from arguments such as the following ... ")--
and both rational and empirical approaches arrive at the same general view of science, 
a view that describes its generic methods and its generic limitations. The standard 
objection--that Aristotle is an empiricist--is invalid. Elements of both empiricism and 
rationalism are present in Aristotle's account. Indeed, Lewes goes to the extreme of 
arguing that "[i]t is clear that [Aristotle's] conception of proof is one which inevitably 
tends to make investigation metaphysical and a priori" (Lewes, 116). This is 
overkill, but certainly strands of rationalism, and of a general view of the sciences 
that overreaches the regional limits of the sciences, are present in Aristotle. Thus, 
the need that science take the entire universe within its purview, and the permeability 
of the generic limits of regional sciences, when coupled with the similarity of 
Aristotle's views on the goals and grounds of the various sciences and the frequency 
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of his abstract discussions of science, which seem unattached to any specific science, 
suggest that these regional and changeable limits should not be applied to the concept 
of science itself, whether it has arisen through an empirical analysis or an a priori 
construction. 
The order and unity required for science must also be necessary, and, in a 
sense, eternal--there must be a unity that extends through time. Hence, Aristotle 
argues that the primary conditions are necessarily the case, since "the object of 
scientific knowledge is of necessity," and so scientific knowledge is also "eternal, for 
things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal and things that are 
eternal are ungenerated and imperishable" (Nie.Ethics, 1139b22-24). Knowledge is of 
the unchanging, determinate essence, and this seems to rule out the possibility of a 
science of matter, potential and the accidental, for Aristotle regards these as 
indeterminate and unknowable. But they are necessary objects of any scientific 
inquiry--if indirectly--for they concern the source of change, differentiation and 
identity, and so Aristotle gives knowledge a more extended sense. In examining that 
which is, science has to examine matter and potential as well, and these must also 
admit of ordered explanation as if they were determinate and unchanging in their 
modes of relation. The possibility of this science of potential, which shall be 
examined later, is hinted at in Aristotle's equivocation on the idea of necessity. 
Aristotle distinguishes scientific knowledge, which is of the eternal, from artistic 
knowledge and practical wisdom, whose objects are not of necessity, but this does not 
mean that the latter two are any less eternal. Art, for Aristotle, differs from science 
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in that it is concerned not with the things that come into being by necessity or by 
nature, but with the "state of capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning" 
(1140a9). But this means that art, like science, concerns a rational order. Chance and 
art are involved with the same objects, and yet art is not unlimited or disordered, as 
chance is supposed to be, for it concerns the one and only true course of reasoning; in 
other words, it follows a universal order, even though it is concerned "with the 
variable" (1140a23). This is contrasted with "lack of art," which is also concerned 
with the variable, but which constitutes "a false course of reasoning" (l 140a22). The 
measure of reason is essentially present in natural and artificial objects. Hence, that 
which is and that which is made are alike rational and necessary, and both can 
therefore be the objects of scientific knowledge. 
To have scientific knowledge, then, requires that the essences of things be 
protected from change, or at least indeterminacy. Aristotle does this by limiting 
indeterminacy and otherness, and gradually removing their essential, radical 
characteristics until they are defined and included within his system. They are said in 
many senses, but these are limited, for if "one were to say that [a] word has an 
infinite number of meanings, obviously reasoning would be impossible" 
(Metaph. 1006b5). The number of meanings is limited and each of the usable senses 
allows for order. By introducing "difference into the identity of the concept," 
Aristotle includes indeterminacy within his system only to subordinate it "to identity 
or to the Same" (Difference and Repetition, Deleuze, xv). To deal with such topics 
as would suggest indefinability--i. e. , matter, potentiality, the accidental, monstrosity 
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and the infinite--Aristotle defines them in ways that show their essential unity and 
regularity. As a result, they fit entirely within his ordered classification of the 
universe. "[T]he determination of the concept of difference is confused with the 
inscription of difference in the identity of an undetermined concept," and 
consequently, "[d]ifference then can be no more than a predicate in the 
comprehension of a concept" (Deleuze, 32). Difference is systematized. However, 
in so doing, Aristotle's system is sheared of the indeterminacy and otherness that 
allow him to be considered a pluralist. Aristotle's will to the totality of scientific 
reason overcomes his understanding of what makes change possible, and hence one is 
left with the image of him as a monist in pluralist's clothing, excluding radical 
otherness and imagining a unified rational order underlying all being. The notion that 
Aristotle allows for any indeterminacy and otherness at all is indeed dubious as he 
keeps them entirely from the formal region of essences while explaining away the 
putatively indeterminate. Order increasingly shows its presence in all aspects of his 
system (cf. Meta.984bl4). 
To overcome the problem raised by Heraclitus and Parmenides, Aristotle uses 
the terms 'indeterminacy' and 'otherness' in several senses, but always with an eye to 
limiting their scope. Indeterminacy and otherness present such a difficult problem for 
Heraclitus and Parmenides because they seem ungraspable, indefinable--ever external 
to the limits of discourse. Aristotle's use of them, however, is predicated on their 
limitation, and thus, a provisional definition is possible. This attempt at a definition 
is, of course, a begging of the question in that "it is not possible to define anything 
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[at all] ; for definition is . . . of the form" ( 1036a28-9). Indeterminacy and otherness, 
properly understood--that is, in a radical sense--have no forms, no unity and nothing 
which allows for linguistic inclusion or definition. Because they lack unity and 
universality, they are unknowable, "[f]or all things that we come to know, we come 
to know in so far as they have some unity and identity, and in so far as some attribute 
belongs to them universally" (999a27-28). Indeterminacy and otherness, taken 
radically, have no unity and order, and nothing to even merit a name at all. The 
mental constructs to which they are thought to refer--apeiron, hyle, tyche, etc.--taken 
radically, have only the determinacy that arises from their being formulated as terms 
of discourse. The possibility of a 'subject' in discourse--as the reference point of a 
term--is grounded on a certain determinacy, for the term is translated from the Greek 
'hypokeimenon ', meaning 'substrate', a word hardly suitable for 'things' that are 
formless and without essential, perduring unity. Terms presuppose limitations and 
oneness--the unity and oppositional identity of the thing--and for this reason, language 
inevitably involves itself in contradictions in the attempt to bring such indeterminate 
'things' to the level of discourse. Hence, one understands Parmenides' studied 
avoidance of nouns and his argument that names fail to capture the essence of things. 
Coming to be and perishing, for Parmenides, "are just names which mortals have laid 
down believing them to be true" (frag.8, quoted in K. Taylor, 16). The being of the 
ever-changing, as Parmenides recognizes, cannot be captured by the determinate 
requirements of names, because some essential stability is necessary for something to 
be called a thing, and this cannot be said of the indeterminate or the radical other. 
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However, this being said, the self-contradictory use of the terms is quite in keeping 
with the requirements of discourse, i.e., that concepts refer to some formed thing that 
is, whether as idea or object. A subject of discourse must be a thing in particular, 
"for it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing" 
(Meta.1006b10). It must also be ordered to the point of unity, for definition requires a 
unity: "it must be a formula of some one thing" (1037b27). Hence, definition requires 
an order, a form and a unity, none of which can be predicated of radical 
indeterminacy and otherness. They, then, seem unsuited for definition, and as a result 
each is normally defined indirectly, by negation or analogy. 
The indeterminate, as unbounded and exceeding the limits of all causal 
sequentiality, has no determinate shape and is insusceptible of causal explanation 
(aitia, causes or explanations). It has no ends or limits. This is crucial, because, for 
Aristotle, the limit determines what a thing is. A limit is "the last point of each 
thing," or "the first point beyond which it is not possible to find any part," and 
something without limits, then, has no end, and thus no particular shape, form or 
essence (1022a4). To limit something is to go outside it, determining its nature by 
opposition to that which (it) is not. But for the universe, this is impossible, for 
nothing is external to the universe. Hence, Aristotle defines the universe as a whole 
from within, as if the borders could be determined even where there is no outside. 
But even this is contingent on the existence of a strict limit between being and 
absolute non-being. This shows the radical character of the presence/non-presence of 
an absolutely unqualified indeterminacy, for the 'presence' of any indeterminacy 
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undermines all oppositionality in overrunning all borders. If the border were itself in 
question, at any point within the universe, none of the borders could be established, 
for they are mutually dependent. That which is indeterminate cannot properly be 
distinguished from that which is not, because that distinction would allow one to 
assign limits to the 'thing'. Hence, the indeterminate, like the Derridean conception 
of life-death, overflows all borders, and abolishes the possibility of limits and an 
analytic oppositional identity. 
This is especially clear in the case of science. The presence of any true 
indeterminacy subverts the entire network of connections in the scientific system, for, 
being unlimited, it cannot be confined to any localized area within or outside the 
system (and there is no outside to a system that must concern the entire universe). 
Aristotle's conception of the continuity of coming-to-be and passing away, in de 
Generatione et Corruptione, appears, at first glance, to imagine this same overflowing 
of limit, insofar as it rejects the conception of a rigid discontinuous border or limit 
between coming-to-be and passing away (336b25), and imagines an infinite, eternal 
return via a periodic cycle of the coming-to-be of the absolutely necessary, in which 
that which follows determines that which precedes as much as that which precedes 
determines that which follows (338a4-15). But the limits lie elsewhere, not in the 
continuous matter--which, as we will see, admits of its own order and determinacy. 
The underlying continuity of life, death and dying obscures the consecutiveness--the 
differentiatedness--of the event and the limits applied by the four causes. "Wherever 
there is continuity in any process ... we observe 'consecutiveness', i.e. this coming-
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to-be after that without any interval" (337a34ff.). The continuity of the substratum 
and of change does not overcome all limits, insofar as change constantly sets up a 
differentiation, and thus, a limit, between this that precedes and that that follows. 
There will always be "a sequence of occurrences," in which one thing precedes and 
conditions the appearance of the other, which is delimited, if only logically (as in the 
formal distinction), from the first; it is a "determinate this" (337b26ff.). Occurrences 
are ordered--limited--in terms of the four causes, and so the continuity of life-death 
will not mean that there is not an essential order and "subordination" of subsequent 
appearances on more originary conditions, though the Aristotelian system of the 
eternal circularity of the absolutely necessary and the mutual implication of its events 
suggests the arbitrariness of the causal limit, for the continuity and circularity of the 
system make it unclear whether the antecedent event conditions the consequent or 
whether the consequent conditions the antecedent or even whether there is really a 
distinction between the two (337a22). But even in the case of the eternal recurrence 
of the same--as in (infinite) periodic systems--this change will be determined by an 
underlying substratum, which is distinct in different substances, and this character 
limits and constrains that which occurs. The eternal recurrence of strictly necessary 
change in the eternal or absolutely necessary substances "is determined by the 
character of that which undergoes it" (338b15). Thus, Aristotle is concerned to 
establish the presence of the limit even within the realm of the continuous, because he 
recognizes that events must be determinate if there is to be science. Science depends 
on the order of limits, on the sequentiality of causes (meaning within each type of 
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cause) and the defined, limited rational forms. The importance of the limit in the 
ascription of identity and order is obvious from the Greek stress on 'horismos'. The 
Greek term 'horismos', like the Latin cognate 'definition', implies that limits are a 
necessity for there to be a term (terminus--end, limit) at all. A thing cannot be 
grasped unless it has a definite limit, a point beyond which it does not extend. 
Indeterminacy is, then, an infinite (unbounded) and ambiguous concept, and it also 
has no order, for order requires determinacy, a measured situating of parts, in their 
oppositions, with relation to the whole. A thing without order (if it is not a simplicity) 
cannot be said to be a unity or to be composed of unities. Unity, however, is said of 
all being, and hence indeterminacy seems to involve either a class of unordered being 
(chaos) or non-being. But Aristotle denies that indeterminacy is of this radical 
character, and he is able to define it and include it within his ordered system, because 
he draws significant limits to its application. It is in each case said with respect to a 
kind of being (in potential, accidentia and the accidental). 
For Aristotle, indeterminacy is said with respect to an absence of act or to an 
inability to completely explain an event or a kind of being. It is said of potential and 
matter and of much of the sensible world, for in this "is largely present the nature of 
the indeterminate" (1010a3). And by arguing that 'that which is' for Heraclitus "was 
identical with the sensible world" (1010a2), Aristotle makes a preliminary move to 
exclude indeterminacy, change and otherness from the realm of knowledge, from the 
formally distinct realm of the universals. But, as we shall see, he is unwilling to 
allow the continuance of unrestrained indeterminacy in any sphere. Aristotle's 
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expressions of indeterminacy are limited and can be said to be a privation of a 
determinate cause or form. The senses of determinacy, then, help to elucidate the 
meaning of indeterminacy. Determinacy, for Aristotle, requires a scientific 
explanation of an event in terms of the totality of the ordered series of (proximate) 
causes by which it comes about. Determining something means, most generically, 
dividing it off from that which is other, giving it an identity, and, more specifically, 
with regard to scientific objects, finding its material, formal, efficient and final 
causes. The absence of the final cause alone is sufficient to leave something 
indeterminate, for "[m]en do not think they know a thing until they have grasped the 
'why' of it (which is to grasp its primary cause)" (Phys.l94b20). A thing is not 
known until the final cause is known. Still, a determinate account requires all four 
causes--not only the final, but also the material, formal, and efficient. "[T]he causes 
being four, it is the business of the physicist to know about them all" ( 198a23). The 
task of "natural philosophy" is to "take account of each of the four causes and refer 
to them all in its explanation of events" (Ross, 78). Reason demands totality, though 
not a Hegelian totality--merely a totality of the proximate series of causes involved 
directly in an event. The determination of a thing requires the totality of the causes by 
which it comes about, for "knowledge requires a totality of the known" (Aristotle's 
Theory of the Infinite, Edel, p.86). All of the causes of an event must be knowable 
for it to be determinate. But there are other senses of determinacy. To determine an 
object is to find its causes, but also its limits and its essence (which is conceived as 
the formal and final causes), for an object is not known as a unity and as that 
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particular object which it is without the knowledge of its essence and limits, in 
contradistinction to that which is other. Hence, Aristotle says that "there is knowledge 
of each thing only when we know its essence" (Meta.1031b7). The essence is the 
aspect of an object that can be determined regardless of the constant alteration of 
things in the world, and even as a thing acquires a new essence, in substantial change, 
this essence, as a universal, rational formality, remains the same, as long as it is in 
the mind and can be predicated of other individuals. This is the first or final cause 
(which, as we shall see is reduced to the first in nature), and knowledge of this first 
cause is necessary for knowledge of a thing. "[W]e say we know each thing only 
when we think we recognize its first cause" (983a25). The first cause is also 
identifiable with the essence or substance of a thing. Aristotle calls the first cause 
"the substance, i.e. the essence (for the 'why' is reducible finally to the definition, 
and the ultimate 'why' is a cause and principle)" (983a27). The essence, or first 
cause, then, is the unity in a thing which remains while the accidents change, and 
indeterminacy is barred from this realm; the essence retains a unity because it is 
unchanging and therefore is not indeterminate. But it should be remembered that 
essence, in the sense of the first cause, is a kind of formal universality that does not 
exclude the possibility of substantial change, as in generation and corruption. 
Essence, seen as that which a thing is, does change, in the sense that a new formula 
comes to describe the nature of the thing, but in this act the old formula does not 
change; it simply ceases to describe the thing, though it may continue to describe the 
essence of other things of the type. When one human being dies, the essence of 
human beings remains 'rational animal', for the essence, or rational formula, as a 
definition, remains the same, present in the mind and predicated of other things. 
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The point is that Aristotle sets limits to the sphere of change, and, hence, to 
the sphere of otherness and indeterminacy, by excluding change from a universal 
realm, and by this move he secures a place for knowledge. Aristotle's distinction 
between essential and accidental attributes, "the distinction between those attributes or 
things true of objects that need not be true of them in order for them to endure or 
persist and those attributes or things true of objects that must remain true of them as 
long as they can be said truly to exist" (Taylor, iii), allows him to go beyond his 
earlier delimitation of the radical character of otherness and indeterminacy and to 
relegate their newly denatured and harmless character to the realm of the inessential. 
The essence, as distinguished from the accidental, is determinate, known and 
unchanging, and since this changelessness is a necessary condition for its being 
grasped or comprehended, this distinction between the essential and the inessential 
grounds the boundaries of science by situating indeterminacy and otherness within an 
inessential, non-threatening domain of being, allowing both to be co-opted for the 
purposes of guaranteeing the rigidity of the limit between secure essence and 
changeable non-essence. And yet, Aristotle is unwilling to exclude science, as the 
totalizing knowledge of change, from this sphere of non-essence. Because essence, 
understood as that which a thing is, is also changeable, no unity remains in the thing 
itself throughout all change--the essential formula does not change but it is no longer 
ascribable to the thing in generation and corruption--and so Aristotle further 
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guarantees the separation between the unity underlying all change and the otherness of 
change by extending a final unity to the prime material substratum, as that which 
underlies substantial change. But since Aristotle considers matter to be the most 
proper realm of indeterminacy and otherness, this understanding forces him to tum 
back from his previous conception of the indeterminacy of matter and to extend the 
determinacy and order of being to matter and potential, the realm of the putatively 
indeterminate--which, in short, becomes the most proper realm for science. Hence, 
the securing of the borders of science necessarily overflows its own limits. Its self-
aggrandizing, totalizing logic can end only by denying the possibility of any sphere of 
indeterminacy remaining other to, and therefore threatening, its provenance. 
Determinacy must, then, be applicable to change, and not only to the strict necessity 
operative in the changes of eternal bodies. This is clear from Aristotle's 
understanding of determinacy. Determinacy requires a form and a regularity in 
change; change must occur in an ordered fashion. The causes and effects of a given 
event must be knowable. That which is determinate must have a particular 
form--there must be a subject to which one refers in asserting x. But without 
continuity in time, knowledge of a subject is impossible. "[l]n pursuing the truth one 
must start from the things that are always in the same state and suffer no change" in 
time, such as the heavenly bodies (Meta.1063a13). Science, using the notion of 
hypothetical necessity--of a necessary order coming into play in the presence of any 
given situation--extends this notion, however, to the realm of the biological and the 
contingent. But the tendency is toward a continuity in time, and this idea of a 
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continuity in time requires the positing of essence and a material substratum. As Kant 
argues, a material substratum is necessary for the mere perception of time through 
continuity. "All determination of time presupposes something permanent in 
perception. . . . [P]erception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside 
me" (Critique of Pure Reason, B275). Without a permanent external thing there is no 
basis for perception, for perception is in time and the permanent allows one to grasp 
things with respect to their continuity or sameness. The continuity of things in time is 
essential for Aristotle, in that the loss of this continuity would destroy the ordered 
regularity of motion and change on which science is built. It would introduce a 
radical otherness, a passing into utter non-being. But Aristotle sets up a rigid 
separation between being and non-being, like the posited magnetic domains of the 
inflation theory of physicists, in which non-being (absolute non-being, not death) does 
not even stand as a limit, for the whole of being is absolutely limited from within, 
and continuity is never violated within the sphere of being. Aristotle's temporal 
continuity is expressed in the material substratum of a thing. Things continually in 
flux lack this temporal continuity and hence admit of no explanation. Consequently, in 
the Heraclitean view, the subject of a statement is not a clear referent, for the thing to 
which a subject refers can never be pinned down in its true oppositional nature over 
time. If we work on the assumption that things in the world change, science becomes 
impossible, unless we posit a substratum that remains the same while the accidentia, 
or even the substantia, change, for without a continuity in change, there would be a 
disruption in the ordered series of causes and a generation from absolute non-being. 
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But, by assuming a material substratum, the understanding of change as continuous 
(de Gen. et Corr. 336a15) and yet ordered is grounded. The assumption of a material 
substratum underlying change abolishes the conception of change as radical otherness, 
and so clears the way for determinacy, and so, in some ways, the putatively 
indeterminate matter becomes the determinate par excellence. 
This use of a material substratum is inherently a move against unqualified 
otherness, for it requires that Aristotle presuppose an essential unity of objects in 
time. He uses Parmenides' definition of change--to become other--but limits its scope 
to that which is predicated of the substratum. Things do not become other without a 
unity in a substratum. In change, they do not become other in all respects, for in the 
process they do not pass through unqualified otherness--i.e. non-being. A unity is 
retained, even in substantial change, where the substratum of prime matter remains. 
There is no change in prime matter; there is change only of that which it underlies. 
This explanation of change denies essential otherness. In change there is no otherness 
in the matter (the substratum) of a thing. For all change, including substantial change, 
or generation and destruction, "something must have existed as a primary substratum 
from which it should come and which should persist in it" if it is destroyed, and this 
is matter (Phys.192a28). As the unity underlying all change, matter (in the strict 
sense, as potentiality) "is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to 
be" (192a27). It is changeless and eternal--not only not indeterminate but the 
foundation of all determinacy. As Ross argues, "matter in the most proper sense is 
the substratum involved in substantial change," though matter is also said of the 
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substrata underlying locomotion, alteration and change of size (Ross, 102). By 
positing a material cause, Aristotle explicitly rejects the idea that things are generated 
ex nihilo or destroyed utterly. Matter is said in several senses, but "in the most 
proper sense [it] is to be identified with the substratum which is receptive of 
coming-to-be and passing-away," although it is also said of the substratum of the 
remaining kinds of change--that between contrarieties (de Gen. 320a3-5). The material 
cause is the substratum that underlies a change. The prime matter persists; nothing 
passes into unqualified non-being. Change is limited to the potentialities of that prime 
matter. Though there is generation and destruction, nothing comes to be from 
nothing, or turns into nothing, in the unqualified sense. Generation occurs "when 
nothing perceptible persists in its identity as a substratum, and the thing changes as a 
whole (when e.g. the seed as a whole is converted into blood ... )" (319b15). In this 
change nothing perceptible remains, but that is not to say that nothing remains, for 
Aristotle does not equate perceptibility with reality (319a26). "[J]ust as people speak 
of 'a passing-away' without qualification when a thing has passed into what is 
imperceptible and what in that sense 'is not', so also they speak of 'a coming-to-be 
out of a not-being' when a thing emerges from an imperceptible" (319a23). A unity 
is retained throughout change, in the material substratum, even in generation and 
destruction, for the distinction between generation/ destruction and alteration lies 
merely between that which has an imperceptible substratum and that which has a 
perceptible substratum (319b10-16). The material substratum does not become other 
in change, for an otherness in the substratum would be a passing into non-being. But 
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"every change is from something to something" (Phys. 224b35). Change is limited to 
an otherness of that which prime matter underlies. This limitation of otherness is a 
move against indeterminacy as well, for it denies that there is any passage into 
absolute non-being in the course of change. That would imply a radical otherness--an 
otherness to the most universal of determinations, being--and an abolition of the limit, 
for the extension of a limit to non-being would imply the continuation of a relation 
and a unity between being and absolute non-being. To allow such a passage would 
mean the movement out of the ordered system of being, and so Aristotle denies that 
there is change involving unqualified non-being. Aristotle's idea of a material 
substratum allows him to maintain his conception of the order and unity underlying 
change without dissolving change. Because it makes change compatible with 
determinacy, the idea of the material substratum provides an answer to Heraclitus and 
a partial answer to Parmenides, in that it rules out the idea of change as a passing into 
non-being. 
And yet change would be impossible if there were no indeterminacy in the 
system, if there were no potential for change. Aristotle's solution to Parmenides is to 
introduce the notion of potential as an indeterminacy in the system that allows for 
change. "Potentiality gives Aristotle a way to save both ex nihilo nihil fit and 
substantial (existential) change. There need be no absolute non-being" (Preus, 50). 
Potentiality allows for change without undermining the possibility of a real 
substratum, but this solution is not without problems. The difficulties with this 
solution are ontological and rational. The rational problem is that any indeterminacy 
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in the system places the totality of explanation of the entire rational system in doubt. 
The ontological problem is that any indeterminacy cannot be act, and hence 
indeterminacy seems to imply chaos, a realm of ideas or forms, or non-being. I will 
address the ontological problem first. 
Aristotle's solution to this problem is well-known. He argues that the being of 
act is not the only kind of being. "There are many senses in which a thing may be 
said to 'be', but all that 'is' is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing," 
one physis (Meta. 1003a33-34). The idea that there are various senses of being allows 
Aristotle to ascribe being, and hence, unity, to something formless and indeterminate. 
This equivocation of being also allows him to remove the locus of indeterminacy from 
form--to safeguard the totality of his rational system--and to permit the existence of a 
potential for change. The solution involves an otherness in being that, nonetheless, 
retains a unity. Though it is without form, potency is, nonetheless, a kind of being. 
Potency is other in being to the actual, but it is still one of the senses of being, and 
therefore it retains a unity. This alternate sense of being is said to be indeterminate, 
for indeterminacy is said of being that is not actual, for all that is actual has a form, 
and, hence, limits. If there were only one category of being, then there could be no 
indeterminacy within Aristotle's world system, for the indeterminate would either be 
the nature of things and would thus have form, or it would be nonexistent and not a 
subject of discourse. If it had form, then there would be no potential for change. 
There would only be the actual. If it were non-existent there would be no knowledge 
of it and it could not be said. 
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But the indeterminate, in the sense of potential, matter, chance, monstrosity 
and the infinite, is a special kind of otherness. Because being is said in many senses, 
it is possible to have something that is other to form, but not to being. The 
indeterminate retains a kind of being, and though it is not the same kind of being as 
that of the actual, it retains a unity with the other kinds of being, for every sense of 
being refers to one central point. The indeterminate for Aristotle is not an example of 
an otherness beyond unity, for it has nothing to do with unqualified non-being. It still 
has unity in that it refers to something that is in some sense. Unity is not something 
that could be said of something wholly indeterminate or of non-being. But it is said 
of Aristotle's notion of the indeterminate, insofar as potentiality, the accidental and 
matter are beings, and all beings are possessed of a certain unity, and so Aristotle's 
indeterminate is not other to unity. This unity is not merely linguistic; it is not merely 
the unity that necessarily arises in the expression of a term--i.e., because a subject 
must be referred to in the concept 'indeterminacy', the term must refer to something 
that is and is one. Rather, this unity is expressed on the level of being, though this 
idea is questionable with respect to chance events and the shifting boundaries of 
matter. Aristotle conceives of matter and potential neither as linguistic categories, 
nor as unqualified not-being, but as beings possessed of unity, in a certain sense. His 
limitation of the radical character of indeterminacy and change, then, is not limited to 
the necessary unity presupposed by raising something to the level of logos, for he 
attributes a certain unity and constancy to change and 'indeterminate' beings. 
Indeterminacy and change are made possible, on the level of being, by the 
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Aristotelian equivocation. Their further limitation possibilizes science. 
The science of being requires determinacy. Science is dependent on order, on 
the rule-governed separation and combination of objects, and on the regularity of their 
changes. If the equivocation of being via potential is to explain all change, then 
potential must not be open to sheer indeterminacy. But sheer indeterminacy means 
any indeterminacy in that anything unexplainable, like a miracle, or any change in 
genus or essence will have no rational ground whatsoever. Reason cannot even begin 
to comprehend such a thing for it seems to involve a move into or out of non-being. 
Indeterminacy implies that an event does not have a rational ground at all, no matter 
how far one goes back. Non-being is no sort of ground at all; it is an abyss of 
ground. And science cannot have anything to say about this, "for scientific 
knowledge involves apprehension of a rational ground" (Meta. l040b33). As a result, 
indeterminacy brings into question the order of the system as a whole, because it 
suggests that the order found is chimerical and rests on something other, which could 
intervene and disrupt it at any moment. This explains Aristotle's (literal) fixation on 
determining the place of otherness and indeterminacy and guaranteeing this 
inductively for all future time. The changelessness of knowledge's objects and the 
regularity of their change cannot be held hostage to an unrestrained otherness that 
might disrupt their order at any time in the future. 
In fear of such a situation, Aristotle banishes that sort of indeterminacy from 
potential, and by this limitation of indeterminacy, he retains the possibility of science 
and the totality of his system. Indeterminacy is permitted for one step back in a 
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process, but it never goes farther than that. Beyond one step the string of rational 
explanations supervenes, obviating the possibility of a Hegelian 'bad infinite'. An 
accident, for example, "is not an accident of an accident ... [the series of accidents] 
cannot form an infinite series . . . for no unity can be got out of such a sum 11 
(1007b2-10). Unity is always retained in Aristotle's notion of the indeterminate. Sheer 
indeterminacy has no unity whatsoever, and so it presents the danger of events 
passing into nothingness or the meaninglessness of an infinite series. Aristotle limits it 
out of a horror vacui, imagining the irrational string of events receding into the void. 
If there were an infinite series and no final cause of a thing, then "there [would] be 
[no] reason in the world 11 (994b 14). Such an idea would "destroy science" (994b21). 
Indeterminacy, then, must be controlled for there to be science. Science is an 
investigation of potentiality, for there is no change in this world without a potential 
for change, and so science requires that potential admit of some predictability, some 
understandable cause of change. Without this proviso, science would be impossible, 
for 11 all science is either of that which is always or of that which is for the most part 
.... The thing must be determined" as happening in this way (1027a20-22). The 
potential that is in things must have a predictable nature. (This despite the fact that 
nature (physis) has a dynamic sense.) Science requires an ordered potential; things 
must happen always or for the most part, and in an orderly fashion. That this is 
actually the case is proved by the manifest existence of sciences. Aristotle, in his 
empiricist garb, looks to the world and sees that sciences actually exist, and so he 
concludes, by a transcendental argument (if not by a thoroughly a priori stipulation), 
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that things do in fact happen in an orderly fashion, that potential is determinate. 
Science is an investigation of potential and the material substratum, and thus 
they must be a kind of ordered being if there is to be science, for science is ordered 
knowledge of ordered being. Indeed, as Aristotle says, "[t]he underlying nature [the 
material substratum] is an object of scientific knowledge, by an analogy" (191a8). 
This is not a direct form of knowledge, but it allows the examination of the 
supposedly indeterminate potential and matter. "Through analogy ... is the 
absolutely undetermined matter of sensible things brought to our knowledge" (Owens, 
59). This dependence on analogy exposes Aristotelian science to a deconstructionist 
critique, as in Deleuze, who argues for "[t]he impossibility of reconciling univocity 
and analogy" (Deleuze, vi). This is not without an anticipatory ground in Aristotle, 
who argues that the necessity of analogical investigations of matter and potential is 
caused by their indeterminacy. But Aristotle recognizes that the study of matter and 
potential is crucial for science, and so rather than assuming that the paradigm of 
science is necessarily indeterminate--that science, as Freud says in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, can never reach the level of being because it is necessarily 
metaphorical--he assumes that the need for analogy, and for the assumption of 
unprovable first principles, does not disqualify the possibility of an ordered science. 
The necessity of using analogy in examining matter and potential does not disallow 
them from an essentially ordered 'movement'. 
Scientific knowledge--which actually exists, according to Aristotle--is possible 
only of things that happen always or for the most part, and since potential and the 
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material substratum are objects of scientific knowledge by analogy to act, they must 
be actualized in regular ways. The kind of change potential permits must also be 
limited, for scientific knowledge excludes any change whose otherness exceeds all 
limits and unity. An ordered system implies orders, kinds, genera and species. Things 
that happen determinately must move in regular ways without stepping out of their 
regular orders. Thus, a certain measure of determinacy must be said of the 
supposedly indeterminate concepts of potentiality and matter. They are objects of 
scientific knowledge by analogy, they are actualized in regular ways and they do not 
involve change in species or genus, considered with respect to the particular change in 
question. According to Aristotle, qualitative, non-substantial change--i.e. alteration--
proceeds between contraries within a genus (Meta.1057a26-32). As such, alteration 
retains a unity. Two things of the same genus have "that one identical thing which is 
predicated of both and is differentiated in no merely accidental way, whether 
conceived as matter or otherwise" (1057b37-1058al). The particular respect in which 
things are identical is essential, and thus "to change from one genus to another genus 
is not possible except in an incidental way, as from colour to figure" (1057a27). 
Such a change would be material, a change from one sort of matter, with given 
potentials to another, and this form of otherness implies a passage into non-being, for 
it would require the destruction of the ultimate substratum prior to the generation of a 
new thing. And yet, this account of change seems to privilege alteration. More 
radical changes do occur, such as substantial changes, but even in these cases a unity 
of the prime material substratum is retained; there is never a complete otherness in 
change. Change is to become other. But Aristotle's notions of otherness are as 
restricted as his senses of indeterminacy. 
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Otherness is first and most basically the heterogeneity of being. There is 
otherness if there is not a simplicity. A simplicity has no parts and all is one. If there 
are parts then there are things that are other to the other parts and to the whole. Thus, 
'"[o]ther or the same' can ... be predicated of everything with regard to everything 
else--but only if the things are one and existent" (Meta.1054b18-19). But for 
Aristotle, all that is is one, i.e. , every thing is a being, and every being is a unity in 
itself. Hence, there is nothing that is itself other to the one, or to being, in an 
unqualified sense. This applies even to Aristotle's view of otherness. Otherness is 
not predicated of things that lack unity or are non-existent; it is predicated solely of 
beings that are one, and that are related somehow, as other to something. The concept 
of otherness, for Aristotle, as a linguistic term, requires that it have a subject, that the 
term 'other' refer to something (i.e., something that is one, that is a whole)--to a 
particular thing, something definite, and consequently to something that is--but this 
determinacy is extended beyond linguistic requirements to the level of being. The 
expression of otherness as denoting something non-existent is disallowed by Aristotle 
because such a reference is unintelligible--it is to nothing. As he argues in On 
Interpretation, an expression referring to something which is not is an indefinite 
noun--it doesn't properly refer to anything at all (16a30). There must be a subject for 
there to be things predicable of it, including non-existence. Unity and being are 
necessary for a subject to exist. Thus, Aristotle rules out unqualified otherness; there 
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is nothing that is other to being in an unqualified sense. All that is, or can be said, is 
a being, and is one with other beings, qua being. There is nothing that is wholly 
other. Change is to become other, but since unlimited, unqualified otherness is ruled 
out, there must be a kind of limited otherness if there is to be change. And otherness 
is necessary not only for there to be change, but also for the explanation of change. 
In change, an aspect of something becomes other than it originally is. It does 
so either by means of something other, in the sense of the external, or by something 
in the same thing "qua other" (Meta.1019a15-16). A unity does not change by virtue 
of itself, and there is nothing to which it can change if there is no otherness, and so 
otherness is necessary if there is to be change. Being cannot be a Parmenidean unity 
without otherness. There must be a plurality, for change occurs via the other (the 
efficient cause), into the other. All arts, for instance, "are originative sources of 
change in another thing or in the artist himself considered as other" (1046bl). This is 
the case in nature as well. Change in nature occurs internally, as well as externally, 
for things in nature have an internal principle of motion (Phys.192bl4), but even this 
internal change occurs via the other, a situation implied by Aristotle's concern to 
prevent the interminable otherness of an infinite causal series by placing an unmoved 
mover at the beginning, a deity that is one, self-present and moved by itself, not qua 
other, or by an other. Thus, in Aristotle's examination of natural motion, he 
determines that a thing which is said to be one may have parts, and it is by virtue of 
the otherness of parts that it is able to change internally. The most basic sort of 
otherness is the otherness of parts, which is necessary if everything is not to be a 
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unity. Otherness of parts must also exist for a subject to have predicates. Internal 
change happens via this sort of otherness--something makes a change in the thing qua 
other. But this otherness is not complete, for a thing must still have a unity in some 
sense for it to be called a thing. Otherness must be constrained by the limit, and unity 
must underlie it, if there is to be knowledge. The essential unity of a thing is its 
substance, and does not include its accidents, and therefore it is stable and definable 
(1031a19). Substance can be divided into two kinds, the concrete thing--the formula 
and the matter (not the prime substratum)--and the formula by itself, and only the first 
can be generated and destroyed (1039b20), but in either case something unified is 
retained throughout all change--the formula predicated of the thing and the prime 
matter. The prime matter, as the basic substratum of all change, can never change, 
and neither can the formula, even if the formula is no longer true of the thing 
(Cat.4a37-4b2), that is, if it may no longer be predicated, for example, of a desk that 
has been changed into a chair, for "there is nothing that can alter the nature of 
statements and opinions" ( 4b 10). But the unity of a thing can also be considered as 
the thing, plus its differentiae and accidents, and this conception of the thing 
precludes definition, for the accidents are always changing. However, in change, 
there is no complete otherness with respect to all unity, that is, no otherness in 
formula or prime matter. 
The second kind of otherness is in concrete form. Things that have a unity in 
an essential respect, such as members of a species, are other in this sense. But they 
remain related by the unity of species. "The concrete thing is other, but not other in 
species, because in the definition there is no contrariety" (Meta.1058b7-8). In things 
which are other in species, there is a contrariety in the definition. This does not, 
however, imply that there is no unity in the respect in which the things differ--for if 
they differ in their type of animality, they are both animals. This unity is necessary 
for two things to be related at all. 
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Otherness in species does not abrogate this sort of unity. Things which are 
other in species are identical in some essential respect, and this is their genus 
(1054b30). Otherness in species involves a similarity in some essential respect--such 
as animality. Things with no common aspect, but which are still possessed of unity 
and being, may be said to be other in genus. Things other in genus are beyond 
complete difference, for difference [note that Aristotle also refers to a difference 
between genera, but only rarely] requires a comparison. To use an imperfect analogy, 
things which are other in genus are like apples and oranges; there is no way to 
compare them on equal terms; "things which differ in genus have no way to another, 
but are too far distant and are not comparable" (1055a7). A more proper analogy to 
otherness in genus would be a comparison of a human to a stone. They differ in all 
aspects except that each is a substance, and substance is not some quality by which 
things may be compared. There is no means to compare them, for their "proximate 
substratum is different, and [they] are not analysed the one into the other nor both 
into the same thing (e.g. form and matter ... )" (1024bl0-13). They cannot be 
reduced analytically to any sort of unity beyond that of the merely formal description 
of each as substance. This sort of otherness is beyond complete difference (1055a7). 
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For Aristotle, it seems as if there is no otherness beyond this sort (1054bl8). 
Unqualified otherness is not a part of Aristotle's system, for such an otherness 
implies the absence of a unity. Even otherness in genus--that of a stone to a human, 
for example--retains a unity in that both can be said to be substance. They are not 
other to being, to the one. Unqualified otherness to the one would not be to the many, 
for the many is composed of the one. Instead, it would be to that which has no unity 
at all. If substance is predicated of all the things that are, then the otherness beyond 
otherness in genus would be to non-being, chaos or a kind of non-being, such as 
potentiality. Hence, the notion of otherness, while necessary for there to be order in 
being, nonetheless calls into question the possibility of oneness. If everything were 
other to everything else, in the sense of having no common aspect, then there would 
be no means of comparing them; there would be no measure, no order or logos. The 
one could not be "the measure of all things, " for it would not be in all things 
(Meta. l053al8). If the other were without unity, then it would be impossible to even 
refer to it, for 'it' would no longer be one thing, and "[t]o speak of 'something' is to 
speak of 'some one thing'" according to Plato's Sophist (Sophist, 237). This other to 
unity could not even be spoken. 
Otherness in the senses discussed by Aristotle does not have this problem, 
however. Things which are other in species are one in the respect in which they 
differ. Things which are other in genus are not one in that sense. But as referents in 
discourse they are one in the sense that they both have unity and substance and are 
possible subjects of logos. Aristotle's other is used in any of these limited senses, for 
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it does not involve a change away from substance (to or from non-being) or from 
genus or even species. As such it does not involve otherness in the material 
substratum or complete otherness. The principle of difference involves the retention of 
a unity in some respect. Unqualified otherness, a difference without similarity, is 
between things to which no common predicate may be assigned, or even between 
something real and something of which nothing could be predicated. The unqualified 
other is that which does not have any sort of unity with a given subject. This form of 
otherness may be defined negatively only, in terms of the genus within which one 
exists and speaks. To be consistent, one must regard it as outside of one's discourse. 
But Aristotle's 'other' is limited. It is included within the system and not passed over 
in silence, because its lurking absence would call into question the entire attempt to 
establish a science of ordered being, a science of the central point to which all that 
exists refers. The science of being must surround itself with the rational and the 
known in order to exclude that outside it which would destroy its regularity. Thus, 
Aristotle says that the source of change--potential (Meta.1019b36)--is a kind of being, 
and limits indeterminacy by placing it within ordered potential. 
CHAPTER TWO--POTENTIAL AND MATTER 
Potential would seem prima facie to be a case of indeterminacy. Aristotle 
conceived it originally as a way of bringing an indeterminacy into the world that is 
not non-being, but that allows for regular change, without obviating the unity of a 
substratum. For Aristotle, change occurs always with respect to something constant, 
to a realm of being that is not changing. His equivocation of being makes this 
possible. If all being were act, then nothing could happen. But if, on the other hand, 
all being were merely potency, then no potency could be actualized. Hence, 
Aristotle's separation between act and potency, between definite being and indefinite 
potential, is necessary if there is to be ordered change, change that does not transcend 
all unity. An essential aspect of this location of indeterminacy in potential, and not in 
form, is that it preserves for Aristotle the possibility of determinacy in act. Act, or 
form, is freed of any destabilizing indeterminacy by the equivocation of being, by the 
separation of being into act and potency. But while Aristotle calls potential 
indeterminate, he limits the extent of its indeterminacy in order to retain the viability 
of the sciences of being and nature. Science requires that there be an order in change, 
but this order would be lost and an explanation of change would be impossible, if 
unrestrained indeterminacy were said of all (things), and if potential were 
indeterminate to the extent that it did not admit of any essential order. Aristotle 
understands the radical character of the challenge. Likening Anaxagoras' famous 
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remark, purged of its self-contradictory formulation ('all things were mixed in all' 
implies that things were in fact separable as such, whereas 'all was mixed in all' does 
not), to the views of the 'modems', he recognizes that it denies all knowledge, for 
"nothing could be truly asserted" of such an indeterminate being in which "nothing 
was separated out" (Meta.989b6). Order must be present in nature if there is to be 
knowledge, and so he is concerned to prove that nature does in fact have an order 
which prevents unlimited change. "[N]ature does not allow any chance thing to be 
mixed with any chance thing" (989b 1). This includes the mixture of all in all, for 
such an Anaxagorean ontology would exclude the limit and, with this, all predication. 
A limited kind of indeterminacy is, then, said of a qualified kind of non-being 
(potential) and of the inessential (the accidental), thus clearing a place for determinacy 
and knowledge of the things in the world. This paradoxical step follows from the 
logic of the system. Potential must be limited in nature and extent and yet 
indeterminate for it to constitute an alternative to chaos, non-being and act. 
Indeterminacy is found in potentiality, because potential is a kind of qualified 
non-being. "[l]t is that which exists potentially and not in complete reality that is 
indeterminate" ( 1007b28). It is indeterminate because it is not something in particular 
with limits; it does not have form, and "[b]y form I mean the essence of each thing 
and its primary substance" (1032bl). Potential is not a 'this' or a 'such'. It is not 
therefore defined by limits. It is not actual, and for this reason the Sophists call it 
non-being. Only a being that is actual can be determinate in the full sense. Potential is 
indeterminate in these senses, and this sort of indeterminacy is a necessary condition 
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for it to play its role as that which makes change possible. But Aristotle, desiring that 
his system be total, demonstrates that, in a way, potential is determinate. He 
gradually reduces the scope of the indeterminacy of potential and matter until one 
begins to wonder whether there is any indeterminacy at all. The indeterminacy of 
potential is inextricably linked to the indeterminacy of matter, and so, in discussing 
the indeterminacy of potential in change, I have found it necessary to discuss first the 
indeterminacy of matter and its connections to potentiality. 
The locus of indeterminacy is not arbitrary or indeterminable, for it is in 
potential, and potential is in matter. Potential and matter are linked, in that potential 
is a feature of the material substratum and, like prime matter, it cannot be said of a 
'this'. Although it is something real (in a sense), matter "is [also] indefinite" 
(Meta.1037a28). Thus, Aristotle likens prime matter to the apeiron, conceiving the 
former as "matter absolutely unqualified, which is nowhere found in nature and 
intrinsically unknowable," a privation of form and qua se "everlasting and 
indestructible" (Seligman, 29). Potential, like matter, is a kind of indeterminate 
being, and yet unchanging and eternal qua se. Potential and prime matter are not 
things to which one can point, but this does not mean that they are (unqualified) 
non-being. If they were, then there would be creation ex nihilo and discontinuity in 
nature. Rather, matter is in things--is, in a sense, the things--and potential is in 
matter, and each is said to ref er to being. Potential and matter are indeterminate in 
the sense that they do not have actual form. They are other to the actual, with respect 
to form (as theoretical constructs--insofar as they can be examined in many ways--
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they have no actual form; but they do have a certain determinacy with respect to their 
possible effects in any given case) and kind of existence. But matter and potential are 
not that alien and indeterminate, for matter is what things are made of, and potential 
is in things. The matter "is nearly, in a sense is, substance" (Phys. l92a5). Thus, 
potential and matter are not unqualified non-being, and they also should not be 
thought to exist in some realm of ideas. For Aristotle, a distinction in being does not 
necessarily imply a realm of ideas existing separately from individuals. His assertion, 
then, of potential as a kind of being that is 'in' existing things is his response to the 
Platonic 'error' of ideal forms. If potential and matter are indeterminate, they are, at 
least, not indeterminate with respect to being, and Aristotle limits their indeterminacy 
even further in order to maintain the possibility of science. 
Matter and potentiality are determinate in several senses, among the most 
important of which is their well-defined use as theoretical constructs, with clear 
referents, in explaining change. Because science is unable to directly apprehend 
matter, it uses it analogically, instead, as the unity underlying change. Matter "is a 
functional term for whatever it is that endures through a change in the capacity of 
substratum" (Code, p.85). This always admits of a certain equivocation. Matter 
"comes to be and ceases to be in one sense, while in another it does not" (Phys. 
192a25). Prime matter is indeterminate in that it is not a 'this' --one cannot point to 
it--and yet as a kind of construct, it is determinate. Matter is determinate with respect 
to a given form, but any one thing can be looked at, from different perspectives, as 
providing the matter for many different kinds of objects. However, in each case the 
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potential of matter is determinate with respect to its particular context, for it is in 
each case tied to a given form. Hence, Aristotle argues that matter "is a relative 
term: to each form there corresponds a special matter" (194b9). In this sense, matter 
appears to be more of a theoretical construct than anything else, for it depends on 
how one examines something. The matter of a club might be the same matter as that 
of a chair, looked at in another way. This fluidity implies its indeterminacy, for it 
suggests that matter is infinite. But these are theoretical constructions--infinite 
divisions of the same material. Matter can be conceived in any number of ways, no 
matter how extended. Thus, Aristotle argues that the matter of man is not only man, 
but the sun as well (194bl4). Moreover, changes in matter do not imply any 
generation or destruction ex nihilo. An imperceptible material substratum remains 
throughout all changes. Hence, when matter becomes form, there is no passing into 
the radical otherness of unqualified non-being. A tree branch provides the matter for 
a chair, and that chair provides the matter for fire, and throughout these changes a 
certain primal substratum remains. There is said to be no matter in form, but this is 
merely a way of looking at a thing. A chair qua wood is matter for fire. The matter is 
the thing from which an object comes, but "a thing is not said to be that from which 
it comes . . . [e.g.] the statue is not said to be wood but is said by a verbal change to 
be wooden" (1033a17-18). Material is formless only in so far as it is a way of 
looking at something as a potential for something else. Matter is a way of speaking, 
a way of regarding x in its capacity for y, though this way of speaking remains 
essentially tied, for Aristotle, to the physical possibilities of things. The sense in 
which matter is indeterminate recalls Aristotle's distinction between qualified and 
unqualified non-being, and his insistence on the discussion of something in the 
particular sense in which it is used, the qua distinction. 
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The limitations of the putatively indeterminate are most apparent in Aristotle's 
explanation of the change of matter. The coming to be from matter is not from 
unqualified non-being. Rather, "'to come to be so-and-so from not-being' means 'qua 
not-being'" (Phys.191b9). A thing comes to be from not-being only in a certain 
sense--looked at in one way. There is always a material cause, for "[o]nly things that 
are said to be in the primary sense--substances--are said to come to be without 
qualification" (Code, 85). All other things come to be from one thing to another. That 
which comes to be without qualification is thought to come from non-being. But in all 
change there is no passing into non-being without qualification. Non-substantial 
change involves the alteration of things predicated of substance. The not-white 
becomes white, for example. But nothing, that is to say, no prime matter, passes into 
non-being in this move, or in any other change. The accidents, and even the essentia 
change (in the sense of substantial change); the substrata remain the same. Something 
not-white qua not-white changes into something white qua white and in this change 
the thing said to be white changes determinately, with the retention of a unity, for it 
occurs only with respect to color, but a unity is retained also in substantial change. 
Determinacy is maintained in all change, for change cannot involve a passage 
into unqualified non-being. In every change, according to Alan Code, "we may 
distinguish three elements: the substratum, the form and the lack. The lack goes out 
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of existence as a result of the change, while the form comes into existence" (85). The 
substratum remains, as a unity, and a certain unity is retained in the determinate 
change of the form and the lack as well. The lack is a privation, but the passing out 
of existence of a privation is merely a way of speaking, for a privation is not a being. 
And yet it is not non-being, in every sense. A privation is said to be in a thing, in 
the sense that "in privation there is also employed an underlying nature of which the 
privation is asserted" (Meta. l004al6). Aristotle argues that "the matter ... is 
not-being only in virtue of an attribute which it has, while the privation in its own 
nature is not-being" (Phys. l92a3). However, when a privation goes out of existence, 
there is nothing that passes into unqualified non-being. The substratum does not 
change at all, for although a thing comes to be from both its privation and its 
substratum (matter), "it is said to come rather from its privation," because that is the 
particular aspect which alters in a change (Meta. l033a8-ll). The matter does not 
change, for "as potentiality it ... is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and 
ceasing to be" (Phys. l92a27). A particular aspect is changed--the privation. Thus, the 
potential for change is with respect to a determinate quality of the thing. As Aristotle 
says, "[p]rivation is a determinate incapacity" and thus change always occurs with 
respect to a determinate aspect of a thing (Meta.l058b27). This rule is not abrogated 
even in substantial change between genera. Alteration retains a unity because it 
occurs between contrarieties, such as black and white, and this means that alteration 
occurs according to a particular respect, a common characteristic--color--which 
includes the contrarieties. But things that are other in genus ~ave no identity in any 
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particular respect--they have no contrariety--and so they cannot change in genus. 
Though Aristotle limits his discussion of change in book X of the Metaphysics to 
change within genera, he admits elsewhere of changes with respect to no determinate 
aspect of a thing, as in the substantive changes of generation and corruption, but even 
there a unity is retained in the substratum of prime matter. 
Change occurs according to a determinate respect. It occurs qua a particular 
character of the agent, and the primary matter of the thing is unchanged. A doctor 
becomes gray not qua doctor--for the substance of the doctor does not go into 
non-being and change genera--but rather qua dark-haired (Phys.191b5). The change 
avoids the substratum entirely and focuses on the particular accidental quality that is 
to be changed. The accidental quality is determined as such by the way in which one 
looks at the event. When a doctor builds a house, the incidental cause is said to be the 
doctor. But he builds the house qua house-builder, and so the determination of an 
incidental cause is purely theoretical and has nothing to do with the action itself. One 
must attend to the particular perspective from which something is analyzed. 'Reality' 
can be constructed in many possible ways, depending on one's purpose, and each will 
still have some foundation in the nature of the thing. Something that can be 
considered matter, if examined in one way, can be seen as form if considered from a 
different perspective. A tree qua wood is matter; a tree qua tree is form. This does 
not mean, however, that there will not be correct ways to look at given things, given 
a certain set of circumstances. Like Plato in the Sophist, Aristotle demands that we 
attend to the particular respect in which something is said (Owens, 55). "[O]ften the 
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equivocal follows along unnoticed also in the definitions themselves. For this reason 
the definitions also should be examined" (Top., 107b6-12, quoted in Owens, 55). 
The goal is univocity, with respect to any given situation, and so one must examine 
the ways in which given beings can be seen in terms of their matter and in terms of 
their form. Aristotle considers the failure to make this sort of distinction the cardinal 
error in previous philosophers' attempts to study the problem of change and non-being 
(Phys .191b10-13). The use of theoretical constructs and universals predicated of the 
things, but not present in them (present in the mind) (Cat. la20), allows change to 
occur without any real passing into non-being. An essential material substratum is 
protected, because only particular non-material characteristics are thought to change, 
things that prime matter underlies. As a theoretical construct, matter does not have 
any form, but it does have unity in time--as a permanent substratum--and being. 
Matter, as one of the three 'elements' in change (form and privation being the 
others), is necessary for any scientific examination of change, and so it cannot be 
completely indeterminate. Matter is determined by analogy, by examination of what 
results from it, and because these results are regular, matter is an object of scientific 
knowledge by analogy. Indeed, it is the final object of the physicist, whose task is 
"to state the form, definition, or end of whatever he is inquiring into, for from this its 
matter can be deduced" (Ross, 79). Matter, and thus, potential, can be examined by 
science. Hence, matter and its potential are not indeterminate in every sense. 
The matter of something, as a theoretical construct, is an object of science. As 
such it is indeterminate only in so far as it lacks form. If it were completely 
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indeterminate, then there would be no scientific way to explain the regularity of 
change. Its determinacy is more than just a linguistic requirement; science also 
requires that there be some limits set to change. Matter changes because it has a 
potential for change. For change to be determinate, potential must be determinate, and 
since matter and potential cannot be examined directly, they are judged to be 
determinate and predictable on the basis of their 'results', on the basis of the 
regularity observed in change. In addition, potency is a kind of being, for Aristotle, 
and so it has unity--for unity is said of all of the things that have being. And although 
potency is said in many senses, "all" refer to one central point, "to the primary kind 
of potency ... a source of change in another thing or in the same thing qua other" 
(Meta.1019b36-1020a2). This source of change is determinate--it is a potency for 
something in particular--and so potency is ordered being. And yet because potency 
comes from matter and matter is not a 'this' it is thought to be indeterminate. 
(Prime) Matter has the same status as potential. As the locus of potentiality, it 
is called indeterminate because it exists potentially, and not actually--one cannot point 
to it--but it is determinate in that it is a theoretical construct, a taking of something as 
something. One can characterize the matter of a branch as the potential for kindling 
or for a baseball bat or for a chair, and in each case the matter has a certain potential. 
The potential is indeterminate in that it has no form. However, as we have seen, 
potential is always a potential for something. The indeterminacy of potentiality must, 
then, ref er to the irregularity of its actualization. But the extent of this sort of 
indeterminacy is gradually subverted by the requirements of science. This creates a 
problem for Aristotle in that potentiality is his answer to Parmenides, and if 
potentiality were determinate then there would no longer be a distinction between 
matter and form; everything would be necessary and there would be no change. 
Everything would be act. Being would be one. The problem can be traced to the 
attempt at a scientific (systematic) treatment of being. 
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Because the notion of science, as ordered knowledge of ordered being, is 
incompatible with an indeterminate object, it would appear that potential (as 
indeterminate) is not a proper object of scientific knowledge. But in Aristotle's 
account, order somehow finds its way into the notion of potentiality. Potencies must 
be actualized in regular ways, since things happen always or for the most part--the 
apparent exceptions being the accidental and the monstrous. And even "the corruption 
and perversion of a thing does not tend to anything random but to the contrary or the 
intermediate between it and the contrary. For out of the province one cannot go, since 
error leads not to anything at random but to the contrary of truth, where there is a 
contrary" (1227a31). This regularity is a requirement of science. Science is the 
examination of the regular changes of being, which is to say, the examination of the 
order of potential and matter. Any discussion of change requires an account of 
potentiality, but without order potentiality could not be a matter for discourse, and 
science would be impossible. Since potential, for Aristotle, is regular, that is, 
ordered, and the exceptions are also a matter for science, science is possible. The 
order in potential grounds this regularity of change, and so the regularity of change 
can be ascribed to an order in the unseen potential. Potential is indeterminate in the 
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sense that it lacks a form, but it is, nonetheless, ordered to certain ends. 
Aristotle's discussion of potential takes the same ordered and determinate 
approach as that of matter. In distancing himself from Plato's ideal forms, Aristotle 
continually turns the discussion to the particular, the determinate, and thus his 
discussion of potentiality takes the same determinat~ and regular form. Potential is 
always a potential for something in particular. As Aristotle argues in book IX of the 
Metaphysics, "that which is 'capable' is capable of something and at some time and in 
some way . . . and . . . some things can produce change according to a rational 
formula and their potencies involve such a formula, while other things are 
non-rational and their potencies are non-rational" (Meta.1047b35-1048a4). From this 
remark it is clear that the science of change is possible, for things happen in very 
regular ways, even the non-rational potencies mentioned above. If potential were 
really as indeterminate as Aristotle claims elsewhere, then no science would be 
possible. But, as we see, the effects of the four kinds of regular change, alteration, 
locomotion, increase and diminution (leaving aside generation and destruction for the 
moment), are determinate as well. Those things that produce change according to a 
rational formula, like medicine, involve deliberation and "produce contrary effects," 
while those things that produce change according to a non-rational formula (the non-
rational potencies, like heat) "are all productive of one effect each" (1048a8). 
Potential, in so far as it lacks actuality, lacks form. It is indeterminate in this sense. 
But it is actualized in such predictable ways that it is determinate enough to be 
inquired into by science. 
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The indeterminacy of potential seems, at first, to be limited to its lack of an 
efficient cause. If potential is always a determinate potential for something, then it 
seems odd that things do not always happen in the same way. Aristotle must be able 
to account for this sort of change if the scientific explanation of the system is to be 
total. One possible explanation is that it is not potential that is indeterminate, but 
rather one's knowledge of the efficient cause that will effect the potential. The 
absence of the efficient cause seems to explain why potential is not always actualized 
in expected ways. Lacking a grand plan for all the actions in the universe, and having 
extremely limited knowledge of the physical causes of actions, Aristotle is unable to 
say for sure which efficient cause will effect a change or what telos is being served, 
for it happens frequently that unexpected factors are involved in a change. Yet, this 
does not undermine the determinacy of potential, for the effect of a specific efficient 
cause is included within potential--it is a potential for something, and this something 
depends on what the efficient cause is. The potential of water to become ice, for 
example, cannot be actualized unless something lowers the temperature of the water. 
If the efficient cause of a change in water is heat, then the potential of water for ice 
will not be actualized, but another potential will be actualized, and in a determinate 
and predictable fashion. Potential is sometimes actualized in strange ways, but only 
when something interferes with its natural causes. That is to say, potential is 
actualized in different ways when a different efficient cause supervenes. But when 
something unexpected acts on something, the effect is, nonetheless, consonant with 
the potential of the thing, given that circumstance, and this should be expected given 
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Aristotle's concern elsewhere to understand the particular respect in which something 
happens (Meta.1058b27). So, for example, "that which can be hot must be made hot, 
provided the heating agent is there" (de Gen. et Corr.324b8-9). A given object could 
be the matter for fire, a club or a walking stick, and in each case the potential is 
actualized in a determinate fashion, given the appropriate efficient cause. A tree 
branch has the potential for being made into a club, but this can only happen if it is 
cut up in a certain way. If, instead, it is burned, one cannot look at the unexpected 
event and say that the potential was actualized in a strange way. Rather, a different 
potential was actualized, the wood's potential for fire. Lightning is an unexpected 
event, but when it occurs it will always cut or bum the wood when it strikes a tree 
branch. The cause is unexpected but the effect is predictable, given that efficient 
cause. Thus, the provision for a specific efficient cause is contained within the idea of 
each potential, and potential cannot be said to be indeterminate in this sense. 
As a theoretical construct (a choice among the many determinate possibilities 
presented to reason and the senses), potential is determinate--it is a potential for 
something in particular. When the potential is actualized in a different way, 'it' is 
really not the same potential. It is rather a potential for something else, which 
depends on the given efficient cause. Thus the term 'potential' is always a determinate 
referent in that it points to a particular potential of a thing, and that potential is 
always actualized, given the particular efficient cause which is thought in the concept 
of that particular potential. If potential were regarded as one of the senses of being, 
and yet as other to the actual in an unqualified sense, there would be no science of 
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potential, and perhaps no science at all, for science is predicated on the determinacy 
of potential. Accordingly, the only thing indeterminate in potential is what will 
actually act on a thing. But looked at in one way, this was never really present in 
potential, just as the entire plan of the relations of objects in nature is never contained 
within each object, though the rationality and order of that nature, and, in a sense the 
grand plan of what would happen if any one of the infinite number of possible 
efficient causes were to act on it, are contained within the potentiality of each object. 
If a potential is a potential for something, then in a sense it contains the efficient 
cause--that is, it is a potential with respect to a certain efficient cause. With respect to 
another efficient cause 'it' is a potential for something else. It would be more correct 
to say that there are distinct potentials contained in matter, each depending on a given 
efficient cause to be actualized. Each one is determinate. "[M]atter when acted upon 
by the same forces will receive the same determination; its indeterminateness does not 
involve contingency. There will be exceptions to rules, but these exceptions will be 
according to rule" (Ross, 77). The indeterminacy is not in the potential, then, but in 
one's failure to know what efficient cause will supervene and actualize one of the 
many potentials contained within a thing. The indeterminacy is in one's failure to 
know the grand plan. 
This is illustrated by Aristotle's view of chance events. The name 'chance' is 
given to "the unforeseen meeting of two chains of rigorous causation" and Aristotle 
considers this an indeterminate event (Ross, 78), but nothing particularly mysterious 
occurs. The proximate causes of the event are apparent to science--for example, the 
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real, and not incidental, cause of the collection of the bill (Ross, 76) is the man's 
requesting that it be paid when he meets the debtor--and the reasons for each man's 
presence are causally known--and so this event does not constitute true indeterminacy; 
it is not other to scientific investigation. From the perspective of a human being, the 
reason for the confluence of these two chains of events may be imperceptible, but this 
does not rule it out from a God's eye view, and this sort of unexpected confluence 
could, of course, be ascribed to almost any event if the causal chains are extended far 
enough into the past. 
In order to maintain the indeterminacy of matter and potential against such an 
argument, Aristotle brings up the notion of a final cause, the natural end of a thing. 
"[T]he final cause is an end, and that sort of end which is not for the sake of 
something else, but for whose sake everything else is" (Meta.994b8-10). According to 
this argument, a thing has a potential for a given end, and the indeterminacy of the 
potential lies in whether the effect will happen for a given end. The classification of 
an event as indeterminate, then, depends on two arguments: that purpose can be seen 
in all events that have a purpose and that some events can be other to the rationality 
of physis and techne. One problem with the argument for purpose is that matter can 
always be looked at in different ways. One might say that a ship has a potential for 
moving in accordance with human purpose, and that when a storm blows it off 
course, the event is a chance event and without purpose, and it is indeterminate 
because "in this sort of causation the number of possible causes is infinite" (Phys. 
198a4). But in this case the cause of the ship's motion is determinate--the wind of the 
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storm--and the potential of the ship is also determinate, in that it might be said to 
move in accordance with either human purpose or a storm's purpose--natural purpose. 
Even though the purpose of the latter is not evident, this does not preclude its 
existing. We need not see it, but it is nature and "nature is a cause, a cause that 
operates for a purpose" (199b32-3). This purpose can be seen as the final cause, and 
hence a final cause is not lacking in unexpected events that happen according to 
nature, such as a storm. Natural events have a final cause in their form. The purpose 
of a natural thing is its form. Thus, the formal and final causes in nature may be 
thought to be identical, just as the formal, final and efficient causes may, in some 
cases, be identical. A potentiality that is actualized without any sort of final cause is 
unnatural, and if such an event were possible, then potential could be said to be 
indeterminate. But, as I will show, none of the supposedly indeterminate events are 
contrary to nature. 
The determinacy of potential is judged by its results. These results are 
determinate and predictable, and so no potential is wholly indeterminate (except 
perhaps the infinite). Potential is limited. It is not infinite. Things regularly produce 
the same things in the same ways. And just as an accident cannot be an accident of an 
accident, potentiality is also limited to one-step of a process. A thing does not always 
exist potentially, but it depends upon something else--it is determined by something 
else. Earth is not potentially a man, and perhaps not even when it has become seed. 
Something is potentially something only "if nothing in the thing acted on--i. e. in the 
matter--prevents it from becoming [for example] a house, and if there is nothing 
which must be added or taken away or changed," and if nothing external hinders it 
(Meta.1048b36-1049a12). The limiting of potential "shows that the concept of 
potentiality and all that depends upon it may not be stretched too far" (Edel, 44). 
Potential is actualized in regular ways, it is limited in extent and it is an object of 
science. Given this regularity, it becomes uncertain wherein potentiality's 
indeterminacy lies. 
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But if potentiality can be explained entirely in terms of causes and determinate 
expectations, it would seem to have the character of necessity. If this were true, then 
all change would be necessary. This, however, is precisely what Aristotle wishes to 
avoid, for if potential were necessary, then all change would be essential, and it 
would be impossible to determine a thing, as it would be continually changing in its 
essence. Aristotle's concept of the accidental is an attempt to overcome this problem. 
The accidental seems to demonstrate the indeterminacy of potential, and so it is a 
concept necessary to prevent everything from being necessary, to allow potentiality 
some leeway. 
CHAPTER THREE--THE ACCIDENTAL 
An accident is said in many senses, and in one sense it is indeterminate. The 
accidental results from matter and both matter and accidents are "indeterminates" 
(Meta.1049bl). In this respect, an accidental term is unlike other things in that "it is 
not true to say that it itself is identical with its essence, for both that to which the 
accidental quality belongs, and the accidental quality, are white, so that in a sense the 
accident and its essence are the same, and in a sense they are not" (1031b22-28). The 
accidental is, in a sense, that which is not self-present, for it is not identical with its 
own essence; its being is pure otherness, for it is other to its own essence. But from 
a different perspective this otherness disappears. The essence of white is not the 
same as that of the man or of 'white man', but it is the same as the quality 'white'. 
Since the accidental is, in a way, not the same as its essence, it is unknowable in this 
respect. The accidental per se is not a possible subject of knowledge, for knowledge 
is of the necessary (Nic.Ethics.ll39b22). "[T]he object of scientific knowledge cannot 
be other than it is" (Post. An.74b5), but the accidental is only that way by chance. 
Science depends upon necessity, in that a predicate "is invariably predicated strictly 
and not accidentally of the subject, for on such predication demonstrations depend for 
their force" (83a19). Without demonstration there is no science, for scientific 
knowledge is "a state of capacity to demonstrate" (1139b31--cf. 7lb9-23). Thus, the 
accidental cannot be a subject of science and, for this reason, the accidental qua 
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accidental is indeterminate. 
But a less prejudicial way of describing its indeterminacy (for the accident is 
only unknowable when taken in a certain sense) would be to compare it to potential. 
Potential is known by analogy, by looking at what results from it, and so the 
unexpectedness of the accidental demonstrates the indeterminacy of potential and 
matter. The occurrence of accidental causes shows that matter does not produce 
something entirely predictable. The term 'accident' is confusing, because it is used in 
two very different senses. Accidents are either essential or inessential, an ontological 
division that also separates that which can be known from that which cannot be 
universalized, and therefore cannot be known. The former type of accident indicates 
those things that change in the world according to the nature of things; the latter 
indicates those things that do not happen in virtue of their own nature. In the primary 
sense, the essential, accidents are the differentiae in the world, the diverse phenomena 
that allow one to distinguish between individuals of a kind or species, and the 
majority of these accidents, seen in terms of their own essences, happen always or for 
the most part, as rule-governed determinations of substance. Accidents, in this sense, 
change, while the prime substance remains the same. The second kind of accident is 
the inessential, and " [ o] f accidents that are not essential according to our definition of 
essential [i.e., necessity] there is no demonstrative knowledge; for ... an accident, 
[in this sense] may also not inhere" (75a20). When accidents occur, but not by virtue 
of their own nature, the cause is said to be accidental or incidental, and it is this sort 
of event that is thought to demonstrate the indeterminacy of potentiality. 
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The status of the accidental in Aristotle is paradoxical, in that it suggests an 
exception to the all-inclusiveness of the scientific system and the regularity of the 
universal, and yet it is, in a sense, the linchpin of the entire system. The existence of 
the accidental is necessary for Aristotle, if change is to be compatible with science 
and definition, for it opens up a second major category of being that can change while 
a unity is retained in the unchanging substratum. At times, Aristotle limits the 
accidental almost to the point of non-existence. He says that "the accidental is 
practically a mere name" (Meta.1026bl4). And, "the accidental is obviously akin to 
nonbeing" in that "things which are in another sense come into being and pass out of 
being by a process, but things which are accidentally do not" (1026b20-24). But the 
accidental has a definite role to play in limiting the place of the unordered in 
Aristotle's system. The presence of the accidental seems to show that all things do not 
proceed from necessity or according to a deliberate purpose. To accidental results 
"there corresponds no determinate act or faculty," the cause is accidental (1027a6). 
The supposed indeterminacy of the accidental arises from the way in which it 
comes about. Although its source can be said to be matter, the manner in which it is 
caused is characterized as indefinite. All matter is indeterminate, but, oddly, not all 
matter is the cause of the accidental. The accidental is limited, shunted away from 
that which is eternally necessary, to the order of the contingent, and delimited even 
there. The cause of the accidental is limited to the matter that is capable of being 
otherwise than it normally is (1027a14-15). Sight, for example, can do nothing but 
see, and so it is an example of a matter that "cannot do but what nature [meaning the 
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essence of the thing] determines" (1227a24). However, necessity does not govern the 
actualization of most kinds of matter, for many things happen only for the most part, 
and not always (1027a10), and so, many things can provide the matter for the 
accidental. The matter of the accidental, then, is indeterminate in the sense that it can 
be otherwise; it is not limited to one possible result. 
This distinction is important for Aristotle, because an explanation of the 
accidental according to causes would reduce all things to the necessary. "If there were 
causes and principles of the accidental of the same kind as the essential, then there 
would only be necessity_ Chance and the possibility of a thing's either occurring or 
not occurring are removed entirely from the range of events" (Meta.1065a10). This 
seems perfect for science, in that it requires that events be absolutely regular, i.e., 
necessary, but this regularity would eliminate both the indeterminacy of potential 
(and, thus, the possibility for change or perhaps freedom) and the determinacy of 
things with respect to their essential characteristics. The existence of potential is 
dependent on the existence of the accidental. Without the accidental, potential would 
be entirely determinate, and one would be pardoned for regarding it as having a form. 
The consequence of explaining the accidental in terms of rational causes is that 
it becomes essential, and one loses the ability to contest the Heraclitean position. 
Change of the accidental would be essential change. However, the world of accidents 
is constantly in flux. If accidents were essential, then essential change would be 
constant, and things would never have a unity; their essential aspects would always be 
changing. There would be no permanence, no unity and hence no possibility of 
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referring to some 'thing' as itself, for permanence of substratum or essence is the sine 
qua non for definition and science. The essential (substance) must be safeguarded for 
definition to be possible, because "only substance is definable" (1031al). If substance 
cannot be defined, then nothing can be defined. Definition and science would be 
impossible, because 'accidental' characteristics would be part of the essence of a 
thing, and no definition is possible of characteristics which are not only innumerable, 
but also ever-changing. Heraclitus would be right. There would only be otherness and 
indeterminacy. 
The idea of accidental change permits some essential unity to remain while the 
accidents change, in alteration, increase, and diminution. The essential things are 
unaffected by the alteration of their accidents, their differentiae. Thus, Socrates 
remains Socrates even when he becomes musical, for the accident of his musicality is 
conceived of as distinct from his essence. Alteration is caused by sensible causes, by 
causes that do not affect the underlying substance, but only the accidental qualities of 
the thing, that is, the accidents that are possible for its essence. "Everything, we say, 
that undergoes alteration is altered by sensible causes [i.e., causes are seen in the 
world], and there is alteration only in things that are said to be essentially affected by 
sensible things" (Phys.245b2-4). Eternal substances do not undergo alteration because 
they are unaffected by sensible causes. When changeable substances undergo 
alteration, their essence changes, in the sense of the formula plus the matter, that is, 
their actual condition changes, but their essence, in the sense of their rational formula 
alone, does not change. Only the accidents alter, because the essence, as a rational 
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formula, is unaffected by sensible things. This separation grounds the possibility of a 
rational, determinate unity (i.e., a substantial rather than material unity) that is 
retained throughout most change. The sensible world is composed of "affective 
qualities," such as sweetness, wetness and color (Phys.244b2-7), and when a thing 
changes in one of these respects, the change is said to be accidental, for it is not 
necessary that the thing change in such a way. The essence of the thing is unaffected. 
When a man becomes pale, the tone of his skin is changed but his essence remains 
the same. This delimitation of the indeterminacy of the accidental secures the 
determinacy of the essence of the thing itself. Thus, by placing indeterminacy in 
accidents, Aristotle preserves determinacy in the unchanging essences in things 
(Meta. l010a3). The essential is unaffected, for the substratum remains while the 
accidents change. 
This provision is made in response to Heraclitus. If the accidental were 
included within the definition of a thing--if it were essential--then the concepts of 
change and unity would become problematic. All change would become essential 
change. Each part of a thing would be essential to its identity, and since things in the 
world are constantly in flux, they would be constantly undergoing essential change. It 
would no longer be possible to refer to the thing as something definite, as a unity. 
The unity in time necessary for definition is essential unity, and this must not include 
'inessential' accidents, characteristics that do not occur according to rule. Aristotle 
avoids the problem by arguing that a thing is not a unity in every sense, for part of it 
is inessential or accidental, such as its paleness or musicality. Paleness has an essence 
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in virtue of itself, but this is not part of the essence of the thing of which it is 
predicated. Accidents are excluded from the essential substance of things; they cannot 
be essential to their remaining what they are, for these accidents are innumerable and 
continually in flux, and their attachment to the essence of things would abolish the 
possibility of the unity grounding their identity. Thus, Aristotle invokes the idea of 
the essential substratum in order to ground his belief in the simultaneous existence of 
change and intelligibility, predicating the unity of things on this substratum. The 
accidental is, in an important sense, not a part of the unity of a thing, for in referring 
to a thing it is the essence that is indicated. The accidental, by definition, is other to 
the essence of the thing, and, indeed, to its own essence, and this otherness, this 
transcending of the unity required for knowledge, makes it inherently unknowable, at 
least according to Aristotle's abstract account of the accidental. Aristotle's notion of 
what parts of a thing belong to its essence may be problematic or even arbitrary, but 
theoretically, the accidental will always be separable from the essential. When the 
parts change, one isn't left to wonder where the unity is--it is in the essence. This 
idea provides a response to the Heraclitean view of a world shot through with change. 
Aristotle protects the essences of the world from such change, and thus, for him, 
things change, yet retain a unity in their essence. 
Consequently, the accidental is carefully demarcated from the essential. It is 
written about as if it were a noble, or inert, gas: it has no effect on the essential and 
the essential has no effect on it. But it carries a heavy burden, for it becomes the 
locus of the indefinite. The accidental (in this sense) is not essential, for it has to do 
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with the contingent, and the contingent can have no effect on the substratum or 
essence of a thing. A person's paleness can have nothing to do with her essence. 
Because an accident is not essential and does not affect a thing's essence, it is 
indefinable. Definition strives for essences--universals--but the accidental is 
individual; it does not admit of generalities. Discourse is of the universal, and hence 
it does not even make any sense to talk of the accidental at all, for it seems to admit 
of no essence. 
In Jorge Luis Borges' story "Funes the Memorious," the character Ireneo 
Funes is able to remember every leaf, every stone, and every person that he has ever 
seen. This ability comes to him when he is paralyzed, but it would be more accurate 
to say that it paralyzes him, for it leaves him completely unwilling to use language of 
a general sort to refer to the multifarious accidents in the world. He rejects Locke's 
hypothetical language in which every tree and every bird has its own name as too 
general. He is almost incapable of using any general Platonic forms at all, for he 
realizes that the naming of a particular dog, for example, would do irreparable harm 
to the individuality of the dog, because its identity at three-fourteen p.m. (seen from 
the front) is not the same as at three-fifteen (seen from the side), and so on. The 
infinity of different things makes it impossible to give names to them all or to do 
justice to their individuality. Words destroy this individuality by using universals to 
explain many different individuals, without accounting for the accidents that 
individuate them. As Aristotle argues, language by the very nature of its universals 
covers over the individuality of the accidents of this world. A knowledge, or a 
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language, that attempted to do justice to this radical individuality, however, would 
soon immediately find itself paralyzed by the infinite number of names required for 
such a project. A knowledge of individuality, based as it would be on the accidental, 
is impossible for Aristotle, because of its radical indeterminacy. Hence, Aristotle 
argues that no knowledge is possible if there is nothing except individuals. The 
accidental is radically individual, and, thus, radically indeterminate, and so it can 
never be the subject of the universals of discourse, for it has no general essence in 
itself. A Heraclitean world, by Aristotle's reading, would be characterized precisely 
by the failure to divide itself between the realm of ever-changing accidents and stable 
substance, and so, such a world would have none of the stable essence required for 
subjects of scientific knowledge. Thus, Aristotle argues that there can be no definition 
(or scientific knowledge) of the accidental. 
Aristotle's limitation of change to the accidents upholds the possibility of 
definition, for it allows essences to remain a unity, but it seems to problematize the 
notion of how one determines essence. Change occurs in the world of the accidents, 
and yet this is somehow tied to the nature of a thing, because natural change occurs 
according to the nature or essence of a thing. The difficulty is cleared up by the 
distinction between the two senses of accidents. Accidents change according to 
necessity or by chance, depending on whether they are essential or inessential. An 
explanation of a thing is, then, made regressively, or analogically, by examination of 
how it changes. Change in itself is not impossible to understand, as long as it happens 
regularly, for regular change shows the nature of a thing. Change is determinate when 
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it happens for this nature, and so it cannot be explained when it does not happen for 
this nature--when the final cause is absent from the change. A thing is known in terms 
of its causes. Hence, change that happens according to the nature of a thing or 
according to the purpose of a rational or non-rational agent can be understood, and it 
does not constitute a difficulty for Aristotle; it is not indeterminate. The contribution 
of the essence of a thing to its change is the purpose or telos of the event--the nature 
of the thing. In essential or natural change, a 'map' of the change remains, and the 
change is limited in such a way as to leave the thing the same in its essence. This 
shows how change can explain the nature of a thing while~being limited to the 
accidents. When Aristotle refers to the indeterminacy of the accidental, then, he 
means the type of accidents that do not happen in virtue of their own nature--the 
events that do not seem to have a natural cause. These events--changes of the 
accidental qua accidental--do not exhibit determinacy, for they do not have a telos. 
The indeterminacy of the accidental, however, constitutes a major problem for 
Aristotle. 
The dilemma is that the scientific system is both supported and called into 
question by the presence of indeterminacy. If, upon close examination, one finds that 
the determinacy in the system becomes total--i.e., when one leaves out the qua or the 
'in a way' distinctions and gets to the per se causes and effects--then the distinction 
between the essential and the accidental disappears. As I have shown, this either 
obviates the possibility of knowing the essence of things or reduces being to one. On 
the other hand, if any indeterminacy and otherness actually remain in the ordered 
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system, this indeterminacy and otherness bring into question the idea of sys-tem, for 
they show that it is not all-encompassing. The order would not seem to go into all 
spheres. This is problematic in that reason, as Kant says, demands totality. The very 
term 'system' suggests this need for wholeness and totality, for the prefix 'sys' means 
whole or complete. Thus the success of Aristotle's project depends on his containing 
the accidental within his system, without eliminating its indeterminacy. He attempts to 
do this by his usual distinction between the senses of a term. 
In a sense, the final cause of the accidental is different from the final cause of 
the essential. The final cause of the accidental is indeterminate (chance), while the 
cause of the essential is nature or purpose. In this sense, the accidental cannot be 
explained scientifically, for the indeterminacy of chance and spontaneity forestalls any 
possible explanation, any determination of the four causes (aitia--explanations). 
Science, like nature, is of that which is always or for the most part, but chance causes 
happen neither always, nor for the most part, and so science cannot inquire into them. 
Aristotle argues that there is no science of the accidental, because there is no 
possibility of explaining it in terms of its causes. 
The sole difference between the causes of necessary and accidental things is 
that the accidental seems to lack a final cause and an attachment to the purpose of a 
thing. Unlike the accidental, the essential or necessary is required for something to be 
what it is. There is a primary cause of the essential--that for the sake of which a thing 
happens. The essential has purpose; the accidental has none. The accidental is a 
predicate of a subject, but not an essential one, not one that can be defined. A 
82 
necessary predicate indicates that which is essential for something to be what it is. 
Accidental predicates, on the other hand, attach to a subject only contingently--as in 
'musical Socrates'. They do not happen in virtue of "the subject's nature" but rather 
in virtue of something else (Meta.1025a13-32). As a result there is no definite final 
cause of the accidental. Aristotle calls the cause chance or spontaneity, both of which 
are indefinite. The accidental lacks order because there is no telos in it. The order is 
absent from an accidental event; it does not happen for a purpose. 
The order of an ordered action must be put into it by nature or a rational 
agent. As Kant writes, a scientist must supply the order of an experiment in order to 
gain any fruitful results, for "reason has insight only into that which it produces after 
a plan of its own" (Critique of Pure Reason, Bxiii). The scientist sets up the rational 
conditions that will allow him to discern something positive and ordered from the 
experiment. The system put into it causes the order and necessity present in the 
outcome. Similarly, for Aristotle, an action that is deliberated upon produces an effect 
that is necessary and not accidental. It is a consequence of the telos that was put into 
the action. An action that occurs according to nature has its own telos already. An 
accidental result does not seem to contain this deliberation or natural purpose and this 
logical relationship of cause and effect. The cause is at first imperceptible. As a 
result, "there can be no scientific treatment of [the accidental]" (1026b4-5). To justify 
this assertion Aristotle appeals, as usual, to experience. There is no science that 
concerns itself with the accidental (1026b5). 
But this is not the result of mere chance. The reason for the lack of a science 
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of the accidental is logical, for science deals with the order that is itself ordered and 
usual. " [A] ll reasoning proceeds from necessary or general premises, the conclusion 
being necessary if the premises are necessary. Consequently, if chance conjunctions 
are neither general nor necessary, they are not demonstrable" (Post.An.87b23-26). 
The accidental is neither necessary nor general, whereas science deals with that which 
is always or for the most part (Meta. l065a5). The accidental happens neither always 
nor for the most part, it does not have a logos, and its causes are said to be chance 
and spontaneity. Hence, the accidental seems to admit of none of the regularity 
necessary for science. 
Initially, it would seem as if this indeterminacy were irrecoverable. In the 
Rhetoric, Aristotle claims that "[t]he things that happen by chance are all those whose 
cause cannot be determined, that have no purpose, and that happen neither always nor 
usually nor in any fixed way" (1369a31-3). This would be a chance appropriate to its 
nature, a chance that could never be investigated by science. The accidental seems to 
fit this idea perfectly, for it is "that which is neither always nor for the most part" 
(Meta.1026b31-2). It is irregular, and therefore it would seem unsuited to the practice 
of science. Moreover, the accidental occurs neither necessarily, nor purposefully, 
although it is often in the realm of purpose. Aristotle gives the example of a man 
collecting subscriptions for a feast who achieves his erstwhile end of collecting money 
when he goes to a certain place with another purpose in mind (Phys.196b33-197a4). 
He collects the money by accident, for the collection was not his purpose in going 
there. The event lacks a telos, and so it is considered to occur by chance. "By chance 
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. nothing comes to be for an end" (Post.An.95a9). There is a telos in the situation, 
but it is unrelated to the result, and thus the result is considered accidental, and the 
cause, chance. But the presence of the telos in the situation is important, for chance 
events operate in the sphere of purpose. The situation is accidental because no logos 
is involved in the effect. The operative purpose, to drink, has nothing to do with the 
effect, the collection of the money. However, looked at in another way--a less 
sophistic way--the causes of the accidental can be determined as natural or purposeful, 
and even the final cause can be determined for accidents in nature. 
The indeterminacy of the accidental problematizes any notion that the entire 
system is ordered. Hence, Aristotle retreats from his blanket characterization of the 
accidental as indeterminate, giving it three causes, and perhaps a fourth. The final 
cause is missing for an accidental event, but only when it is characterized in a certain 
way. When the specific event is examined more directly, however, the final cause is 
always present. The event does not of its own nature happen without a cause; it must 
be constructed in a certain way for the cause or lack of cause to be determined. The 
important point, however, is that the event has an order when examined in a certain 
way. The effect as accidental depends on the way in which the action is viewed. 
Here again a theoretical construct is involved in the characterization of the action as 
accidental or purposeful. An event that is looked upon as accidental is never 
accidental in any fundamental sense. The accidental is a mere theoretical construct 
which Aristotle sometimes chooses to apply to an event. The collection of the money 
for the feast is called accidental because no necessary causes required that that 
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confluence of events occur--that when the man went to the place he would collect the 
money. If he had planned to collect the money there, then the action would not be 
said to be accidental. In this way, Aristotle separates the accidental from that which is 
explainable. "The accidental is not necessary, but indeterminate, and of such a thing 
the causes are unordered and indefinite" (Meta.1065a25). The cause of the collection 
of the money is uncertain, for it does not follow from some rational plan. But the 
characterization of something as accidental depends on how one looks at the event. As 
Aristotle says, the accidental is "practically a mere name" (1026b14). It is not 
something real in every sense, for its indeterminacy vanishes when one looks at it in a 
different way. By looking at the accidental in this equivocal fashion, as he also looks 
at matter, potential and being, Aristotle is able to introduce indeterminate concepts 
that, nonetheless, allow for scientific investigation. Hence, the idea of the accidental, 
and the indeterminacy of the accidental, provide a way to escape the Heraclitean 
problem, in addition to the Parmenidean. 
The telos of the 'accidental' appears when the event is examined directly, in 
terms of its real causes. Aristotle cites the example of Socrates becoming musical as 
an accidental change. The essence of Socrates does not change when he becomes 
musical, and so the change is said to be accidental because it is not an essential 
change. However, the change has nothing to do with the essence of Socrates, but 
everything to do with his musicality. Therefore, the event should be examined in 
terms of the determinate aspect which changes when Socrates becomes musical. This 
event proves to have a telos. Socrates studies music for the purpose of becoming 
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musical, and so the change in him from 'unmusical' to 'musical' is determinate--there 
is a telos in the change. The quality 'musical' is only accidental in that Socrates 
himself need not be musical. He would still be Socrates if he were unmusical. The 
same sort of sophistry accounts for the 'indeterminacy' of the person's collection of a 
subscription to a feast. Aristotle's description of the event as accidental is 
inappropriate. The actual event is the collection of the money, and this does not 
happen accidentally. The person in question does not go into a tavern and ask for a 
beer and instead get a subscription. Rather, he collects the money because he asks for 
it. He hadn't known that he would get the money at such a place, but there is still a 
telos in the actual acquisition of the money--he asks for the money or the other person 
purposefully gives him the money. The way in which the event is viewed determines 
whether it will be considered accidental. Moreover, even in the Aristotelian 
characterization of the event, the absence of the final cause is specifically noted and 
so Aristotle's silence about the other causes should suggest that they are in fact 
present. 
Although Aristotle often claims that the accidental is indeterminate, its causes 
obscure, he does not wish to give free rein to the indeterminacy, for if there is 
anything within the system that is indeterminate or unexplainable, then one begins to 
wonder whether any order applies to the system as a whole. The total character of the 
system comes into question. To respond to this, Aristotle indicates that the event is 
not as indeterminate as it seems. He shows in various places that an event 'caused' by 
chance has determinate causes, is not unnatural, and happens in a fixed way, given a 
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particular set of circumstances. 
The determinacy of the 'accidental' starts on the level of being. The accidental 
does not refer to a new class of being, or to non-being. "[B]oth [accidental and 
necessary] are related to the remaining genus of being, and do not indicate the 
existence of any separate class of being" (Meta.1027b34-1028a2). A separate class of 
being would be other to planned being and would have no order; it would therefore 
be indeterminate. But this is not the sort of otherness that Aristotle would allow. 
"[A]ll things that come into being arise from what actually is," he argues (de Anima, 
431a3). They all arise from a being that is essentially ordered, and this includes the 
accidental. Hence, one of the meanings of being is the accidental (1026a34). Though 
it is not essential or necessary being, it is not different from being. The commonness 
of the various senses of being (they are all said with respect to one sense) permits 
discourse on all beings, whether accidental or necessary. As a kind of being, the 
accidental also has unity. Some things "are called one in virtue of an accident" 
(1015b35) and this is a primary sense of the word 'one'--"that which is one by 
accident" (1015b16). Thus, the accidental in the senses of being and unity (which may 
be the same) is neither other nor indeterminate. 
Nor are the material, formal and efficient causes of the accidental unknown or 
indeterminate. The cause of the accidental is said to be chance or spontaneity, and 
these, as we have seen, are thought to be unordered and indefinite. But the 
characterization of chance as a cause is a theoretical construction, a way of speaking 
about the event. Chance events are thought to have no necessity, but the necessity or 
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lack of necessity of an event is dependent on a certain set of assumptions made about 
the event. A saw must be made of iron, for example, "if we are to have a saw and 
perform the operation of sawing" (Phys.200al2). This necessity is a theoretical 
construction, for "[w]hat is necessary then, is necessary on a hypothesis; it is not a 
result necessarily determined by antecedents. Necessity is in the matter" (200a13). 
The accident is only an accident when looked at in a certain way. It might be 
necessary if examined in a different way, for the necessity of an event is in the 
hypothesis. By saying that necessity is in the matter, Aristotle means that when 
something is taken as a particular kind of matter, with a particular potential, certain 
things are necessary for that potential to be actualized. Matter, looked at in a 
particular way--and matter is always for something in particular--has a particular 
necessity attached to it. But examined in another way, that necessity disappears. It is 
not necessary that a saw have a wooden handle, for it could be made of bone; but it is 
necessary that it have a handle, and so the matter of the handle can be seen both as 
necessary and as incidental to the saw, depending on how one considers the matter. 
The same is true of the accidental. The characterization of it as accidental, and its 
cause as chance, depends on the theoretical construct, the hypothesis, used in 
determining the event. In virtue of one thing, something may be accidental, but in 
virtue of its own nature it may not be. In this sense, an event is very much the 
construction of the observer, for it appears in a certain way, given a certain outlook. 
This idea elicits the paradoxical result that there is nothing necessary about the 
characterization of something as accidental, or about the characterization of the 
accidental as indeterminate. 
The indeterminacy of the accidental, then, depends on how an event is 
characterized, and, as I have said, this primarily refers to the absence of a final 
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cause. An event 'caused' by chance is actually determinate in the sense that it can be 
entirely explained. The purpose of the event may be imperceptible, for the causes of 
many natural events are not at first apparent, but this does not preclude its existence. 
In examining accidental events, Aristotle often shows that the direct cause of the event 
is not chance at all. When a ship headed for Italy ends up in Africa, the cause is said 
to be accidental. And yet there was indeed a cause, according to Aristotle (Meta. 
1025a). A storm caused it. The event is accidental in the sense that there was no 
deliberation and hence no apparent logos to the situation. The matter that caused the 
accidental could have been realized in another way (1027a14-15). The ship could have 
sailed, as expected, to Italy. But the situation suggests that the accidental does not 
constitute an exception to the determinacy of potentiality, for it holds despite the 
innumerable possible ways in which the potential might be actualized. If a storm 
comes, the ship will be blown a certain way. If the winds hold as usual, the ship will 
be able to reach Italy. Nothing indeterminate is suggested here, for the actions happen 
in predictable ways, given a certain efficient cause. The material cause is the ship; the 
efficient cause is the wind and the sea; the formal cause is perhaps the final location. 
As a natural event, the event even has a natural purpose. Hence, Aristotle backtracks 
in many ways from his initial characterization of the accidental as indeterminate, all 
but showing that the accidental is in fact determinate and caused, if not purposeful. It 
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is determinate even in the most basic aspect of our relation to the accidental in logos, 
for "every occurrence is definite in so far as it is a subject of discourse" (Edel, 30). 
The determinacy of matter and potential further problematizes the notion of the 
indeterminacy of the accidental. 
The accidental is made possible by the putative indeterminacy of the potential. 
And yet the transformation of matter's potential into a particular happens normally in 
a lawful manner. Change is consequent upon a material cause in an ordered manner. 
A potentiality in a material substratum is actualized by some agent in a determinate 
fashion. There is no passing into non-being in this change from state A to state B; 
there is no (unqualified) non-being that prompts the change. "Everything that is 
produced is something produced from something and by something, and that the same 
in species as it" (Meta. l049b27). The potential is limited in several respects. A thing 
does not produce something other than it in genus or even species (cf. chapter four). 
Things are not produced in a random fashion; they change from specific materials into 
other determinate things. The accidental is thought to demonstrate the indeterminacy 
of potential, but as we have seen it should be regarded as the necessary imperfectly 
understood; it fits within the context of nature. The accidental is limited, for it is not 
non-being, or a different kind of being, it is not other in form to the actual, and it 
does not arise from non-being. 
The irregularity supposedly introduced by the accidental is only a sophistic 
kind of indeterminacy, an indeterminacy in a sense, but not in a primary sense. The 
indeterminacy of the accidental is only such in a way of speaking or in a way of 
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thinking about it. 11 [T]he accidental is practically a mere name 11 (Meta .1026b 14). Even 
purpose is not necessarily lacking in it. The fact that Socrates is musical is termed 
accidental, because he could be otherwise. If he were not musical, he would still be 
Socrates. But this does not mean that 'musical' is somehow indeterminate. Accidental 
qualities are seen as always changing, and therefore ungraspable, undefinable. 
Definitions reach for essences and the accidental qua accidental has no such essence. 
But Socrates becomes musical by taking a series of steps for the purpose of becoming 
so. Being musical is an inessential quality but it, nonetheless, signifies something in 
particular, and is arrived at as the result of a purpose. There is an essence to 
'musical' as there is to 'pale' and so on. This essence is a theoretical kind of essence, 
a definition of each quality, the idea of which changes as the mind develops a new 
explanation of it. Aristotle argues that it is accidental that the pale man becomes 
musical, for he need not be that always or for the most part (1027all). But this 
explanation is sophistic in that when the pale man becomes musical he does not do 
that qua pale, but rather qua unmusical. A quality or event is termed accidental only 
by avoiding an examination of its proximate causes. 
A stronger case for the indeterminacy of the accidental is made in Aristotle's 
discussion of the housebuilder. For him, the accidental is found in the innumerable 
attributes produced unintentionally in the making of the house (1026b6). The house 
may be pleasant to some people, unsightly to others, and so on, but these attributes 
are incidental to the plan effected in the building of the house. They are not part of 
the logos of the house that the builder provided. The builder did not intend to produce 
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the attributes that arise along with it, and because they were unplanned, they are 
accidental. And yet they are not somehow uncaused, if they are really a part of the 
house. The builder organizes the materials, and by his art gives a rationality to the 
nature of his product, but he has no control over how other people look at the house. 
The house is, in a sense, reconstructed by each viewer, for each time it is examined 
new accidental qualities seem to appear, but the thing itself still constitutes a standard 
for the truth of the observations. The solution might be that the plan of the house-
builder is responsible for whatever order it has, but that a plan cannot cover the 
totality of possible relations between things, and, looked at in a certain way, different 
qualities will always arise. This perhaps introduces an entirely different problem. A 
better approach would be to restrict this examination to that which is really an aspect 
of a thing. 
Seen in this regard, an accidental change is either an entirely sophistic way of 
looking at an event--for example, when the pale man becomes musical, the paleness 
has nothing to do with the change--or has to do with a lack of order or plan in the 
event as a whole. If the first case is dismissed as irrelevant, then it is the unplanned 
confluence of certain events that causes the accidental. When the person collecting 
subscriptions for the feast 'accidentally' finds the man for whom he was looking, 
there is a determinate cause of the event. No apparent reason exists for the confluence 
of events that caused the meeting, or rather innumerable reasons exist for it, but to 
say that the cause is indeterminate is inaccurate. "That which is per se cause of the 
effect is determinate" (Phys. l96b26). Further, the failure to introduce logos into the 
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event does not mean that it is really absent in something seen as accidental. Aristotle 
argues that nature is a cause, a cause that happens for a purpose, but this does not 
mean that the final cause of a natural event is always evident. To argue that the 
storm's blowing a ship to Africa, for example, is accidental is to say that the natural 
event (the storm) had no purpose. The lack of purpose is seen only when looking at 
the event from the point of view of the ship's captain. The event certainly has a final 
cause when examined from the point of view of nature. The characterization of the 
event as accidental depends entirely on the perspective used to examine it. Thus, an 
order is present in what is called accidental that cannot always be determined, but 
which, nevertheless, seems to exist. 
The accidental, thus, is determinate in many senses, and as in his discussion of 
matter and potential, Aristotle limits the otherness and indeterminacy of the accidental 
in order to make science possible. Science requires that the being of the accidental be 
ordered, that its causes be determinate, and that it change in a predictable way. 
Science, for Aristotle, has an ontological basis; reason is present in things (Meta. 
984b 14). The existence of the accidental would cast this into doubt, if it were really 
indeterminate. But, as Aristotle argues, it is not even a special kind of being. We can 
dismiss accidental being (1027b36). The being of the accident is not in a special 
category. It is not other. It is not indeterminate. It has a form by which it is 
understood. Consequently, the determination of a cause as accidental is a hypothesis. 
That which is called accidental is not something completely indeterminate. There is no 
string of accidental causes receding into the void. The accidental and accidental 
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causes are not prior to the essential, for if "luck or spontaneity is a cause of the 
material universe, reason and nature are causes before it" (1065b2). There is nothing 
that suggests that the accidental has somehow arisen from non-being, or that it has 
been uncaused. The characterization of an event as accidental or incidental often has 
nothing to do with its real causes. Aristotle describes the incidental cause of a 
person's health as a flute player. But this is only a manner of speaking. The 
flute-player is also a doctor, and it is qua doctor that he heals the person. The fact 
that he plays the flute has nothing to do with it (Phys.197al4). To call the flute-player 
an incidental cause of the person's health is, then, a mere sophistic phrasing. It is not 
a cause at all. Thus, seen in terms of their essences, accidental events are 
determinate. 
Aristotle's account of the real status of accidental causes demonstrates their 
illusoriness. Luck is defined as "an accidental cause at work in such events adapted to 
an end as are usually effected in accordance with purpose" (Meta.1065a30-32). Luck 
happens in events in which a final cause is present but not actualized. As a result, 
"[t]he causes from which lucky results might happen are indeterminate; and so luck is 
obscure to human calculation and is a cause by accident" (1065a33). The 
indeterminacy of luck is, however, completely undermined in the next clause of the 
sentence. Luck "in the unqualified sense [is] a cause of nothing" (1065a34, cf. Phys. 
197a5-14). Thus, chance is merely a way of speaking of an event that does not 
happen in accordance with the norm. The causes of what happens by chance are seen 
as indefinite, but this is not in fact the case. The indefinite cannot be an object of 
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knowledge, for it is "inscrutable to man" and not open to discourse (197a10). This 
sort of indeterminacy is merely a way of speaking, however, for it might be thought 
in a way that "nothing occurs by chance" (197all). Chance as an incidental cause is 
not "strictly ... [and] without qualification" the cause "of anything" (197a12-14). 
Chance events, strictly speaking, have an external cause and may occur "for the sake 
of something" (197bl8). Even the final cause is not ruled out. The cause of the 
accidental is not indeterminate at all. Thus, the supposed indeterminacy of chance, the 
accidental, potential and matter is merely rhetorical. In each case there is nothing 
indeterminate or unexplainable about it. 
CHAPTER FOUR--MONSTROSITY 
Monstrosity, however, would seem to constitute a real example of 
indeterminacy and otherness. But in fact it is neither. Monstrosity is an example of 
ordered being; its causes are determinate and so Aristotle is able to account for it 
scientifically. Aristotle, initially, sets up the idea of monstrosity as an example of the 
unexplainable, the unnatural, a failure of nature. This failure defies reason, for "in 
natural products the sequence is invariable, if there is no impediment" (199b25). If 
nature inevitably works toward its end, then monstrosity must be caused by some 
other. The production of monsters would seem to bring natural necessity into doubt, 
and to introduce otherness and indeterminacy into the rational world system. 
Monstrosities are thought to be other in species to that which produces them. Thus, 
humans are said to give birth to oxen-headed progeny. But Aristotle claims that 
nothing is produced that is other in species from what produces it. If the monstrous 
is what it appears to be, then it is an example of the indeterminacy of potential. 
The question is whether monstrosity is natural, for if it is natural, then either it 
is explainable by natural causes and purposes, or an unbounded indeterminacy is 
included within nature. And if it is unnatural, then otherness obtrudes upon nature 
and the entire basis of science--regularity and the absence of radical otherness within 
nature--is undermined. The monstrous thing seems different in form from its be getter, 
and consequently, it seems as if monstrosity is an exception to nature. Ari~totle 
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writes of nature in a very different sense from monstrosity, describing it as if it were 
an ideal subject for science, saying that "[t]hose things happen by nature which have a 
fixed and internal cause; they take place uniformly, either always or usually" 
(1369a35-bl). Certainly, monstrosity does not always take place. Hence, if nature is 
defined according to the probability of something happening, then monstrosity is 
unnatural. A woman does not often give birth to oxen-headed progeny, and so there 
would seem to be no natural explanation for it. But, on the other hand, a woman just 
as rarely gives birth to an Einstein or a Jesse Owens. And yet exceptional children are 
not deemed monstrous. Thus, the probability theory of nature--the theory that it is 
what happens all or most of the time--does not explain nature very well, for it does 
not prescribe the cut-off point for natural products--is it what happens more than 70% 
of the time? or more than 80%? 
A better explanation of nature would be according to genus and species. That 
which is natural does not change in genus or species from that which begets it. By 
this account, monstrosity would have to be a real otherness in kind or species for it to 
be called unnatural. The Greeks explained monstrosity by reference to some kind of 
otherness, and this explanation was used for exceptional children as well, indicating 
that a similar source was involved. They looked to the gods to explain offspring that 
were so exceptional or monstrous that they seemed entirely other than their parents. 
And in experience, some children "are not even like a human being but a 
monstrosity" (767b5). Nature produces natural things, and hence such an unnatural 
monstrosity would seem on the face of it to be produced by something indeterminate, 
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something other than nature. The material, final, formal and efficient causes would 
appear to come from nowhere, if they are even present. The scientist looks to nature 
for explanations, even with respect to monsters (Preus, 202), and so if the 
monstrosity were unnatural, it would be unexplainable, indeterminate and other. But 
the monster is not other than his parents in any essential sense. As Foucault says, 
"monsters are not of a different 'nature' from the species themselves" (The Order of 
Things, 155). Although, in monstrosity, "nature has in a way departed from the 
type," (767b7) it has not produced something unnatural. The type is determined not 
by an examination of matter itself, for that is known only by analogy (191a8), but 
rather by examining the actual products of the matter. What happens most often is 
considered natural. But in so far as this probability theory of nature lacks the definite 
distinctions required for (pre-modern) science, a better test of nature would be 
whether the product is of the same genus and species. Aristotle's statements on this 
subject are ambiguous because he uses the term 'physis' or 'nature' in several ways. 
On the one hand, monstrosity is unnatural in that nature concerns that which happens 
for the most part. Thus, he says that something becomes more monstrous the more it 
departs from 'nature' , referring to a type. 
But Aristotle argues that monstrosity is not really unnatural. The monsters are 
"none of the things they are said to be" (769bl 7). They have only a similarity to oxen 
or sheep, but they remain human. They have not changed in their essence or species. 
Nature cannot produce anything other in species. Potential is indeterminate, but in a 
limited sense. It does not produce anything which entirely departs from the type. It 
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does not produce an other in kind. "It is impossible for such a monstrosity to come 
into existence--! mean one animal in another" (769b22). An ox or a creature that is 
part ox-part human cannot be born from a human. A monster cannot actually be of a 
different species or genus than its begetter. Thus, monstrosities are not unnatural and 
they even happen for determinate reasons, though in a sense they are a departure from 
nature. The point is that although the monstrous belong "to the class of things 
contrary to nature" [taken in one sense] they are not contrary to "any and every kind 
of nature," but only to the usual (770b8). The usual is certainly not the best definition 
of nature. 
Monstrosity is not an example of otherness of species, and so it is not a real 
change in nature at all. In any case, "even what is contrary to nature is in a certain 
sense according to nature," provided that the formal cause has not overcome the 
material nature (770bl6). And the causes of monstrosity are not indeterminate. Some 
kinds of monstrosities "generally happen in a certain way but may also happen in 
another way" (770bl2). It seems as if the other kinds are merely imperfectly 
examined. Aristotle writes scientifically about movements relapsing and offspring in 
multiple births getting in the way of each other, and so on. Thus, monstrosity, for 
Aristotle, does not represent a true case of indeterminacy, in that even monstrosities 
occur in fixed ways and for rational reasons. It is not an otherness beyond nature; it 
does not involve a change into another nature (770b24). One cannot argue that it is 
indeterminate merely because the causes are imperceptible, for many causes are 
difficult to detect, and yet a unified material substratum remains, as in generation and 
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destruction. 
The explanation of monstrosity seems to fail only in the realm of purpose. In 
nature there are mistakes, Aristotle argues, and "monstrosities will be failures in the 
purposive effort"; such a failure is due to the corruption of some principle (199b4-7). 
Yet, this argument can be challenged by reference to the concept of nature. As 
Aristotle says, monstrosity is not contrary to any and every kind of nature. The 
monster is not different in species from its begetter. Since monstrosity is not utterly 
contrary to nature, and nature's purposes are not always apparent, the final cause 
cannot be ruled out. Nature is a cause that acts for a purpose, and monstrosity is not 
unnatural. Therefore, the final cause is not absent from monstrosity. 
The absence of a final cause is also thought to make potentiality, matter and 
the accidental indeterminate. This idea, however, is problematized, for Aristotle 
often removes the distinction between the formal and final causes. It is not always 
clear that the final cause, or even the efficient cause, is different from the formal 
cause. This is why the accidental is not thought to have form. If it had form then 
it would have a formal cause, and it would be determinate in all senses. But since 
it does in fact have form in itself--it can be perceived in nature--it must have a 
formal cause. It comes to be something, and though this something is not in the 
essence of the thing to which it is related, it happens determinately according to 
the efficient cause which effected the event. The formal cause may be thought in 
place of the final cause, as is implicit from Aristotle's account in book V of the 
Metaphysics. He states, reducing the example to nature, "as regards the things that 
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are or come to be by nature, though that from which they naturally come to be or are 
is already present, we say they have not their nature yet, unless they have their form 
or shape. That which comprises both of these (matter and form) exists by nature, ... 
and not only is the first matter nature ... , but also the form or essence, which is the 
end of the process of becoming" (1015a2-10). This reduces the four causes to three. 
Things have their nature when they have their form or essence. The efficient cause 
acts on the material cause to produce a form, which is the end of the thing, given that 
particular efficient cause. The situation cannot be shown to have no telos, for as Kant 
says, "it is yet quite impossible to prove in any given case that an arrangement of 
nature, be it what it may, serves no end whatsoever" (Critique of Pure Reason, 
A688/B716). The ends of nature are often mysterious even in Aristotle. As he says, 
things in nature are not always seen. However, he supposes that "action for an end is 
present in things which come to be and are by nature" (199b8). The works of nature 
are not so narrowly seen as to exclude things ill-suited to survive. Nature interferes 
with itself in such a way that it sometimes actualizes the potential monstrosity that lies 
within. Natural things are too often seen in terms of their unity. But it is their 
otherness that allows them to change in themselves--internal change is change qua 
other, as Aristotle says. Natural things have many different parts, which carry on 
different operations. Just as there appears to be no grand plan that dictates when a 
man will collect his subscriptions, there also appears to be no grand plan governing 
the operations in a thing, at least in terms of the synchronicity of the parts. Speaking 
generally, things within the body move at different rates and perhaps, as Aristotle 
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suggests, they occasionally collide--movements relapse and offspring get in the way of 
each other. There is nothing unnatural about this. The otherness in every change must 
be emphasized. But the monstrosity is not other to the human--it is not another species 
or genus--and it is not indeterminate. It is merely a product of an unusual combination 
of natural processes. Monstrosity is produced in this sense like the truth and falsity of 
the logos apophantikos, through combination and separation (1051b2). 
In some sense the accidental and the monstrous are both the results of a 
determinate potentiality. Seen in one way, something might be a potential for a baby 
and in another way as a potential for oxen-headed progeny. When potentiality is 
looked at in a narrow sense--as a potential for something in particular--it seems 
indeterminate, because that potential is not always actualized. But looked at in another 
way one particular potential of the matter is actualized in a determinate way, given a 
particular efficient cause. This never involves an otherness of species or genus. 
Monstrosity, therefore, is not a change in nature, and as a natural event it has its final 
cause in its form. The unification of the third and fourth causes (the formal and final 
causes) means that the potential, the accidental and the monstrous are all determinate; 
they do not even lack a purpose. Thus, Aristotle rules out the possibility of true 
otherness or indeterminacy in his system. 
CHAPTER FIVE--THE INFINITE 
The infinite is the indeterminate par excellence, and so Aristotle's treatment of 
the infinite is highly instructive of his attempt to place the putatively indeterminate 
within the narrow limits of his scientific system. The infinite (apeiron) is the 
unbounded, the unlimited, that which cannot be contained within limits. It is by its 
very nature alien to all limitation, outside of the notion of limit. As such it is 
destructive of all knowledge. Aristotle is explicit on this point. Those who argue 
that no limit is placed on the reduction of essences "destroy science; for it is not 
possible to have this till one comes to the unanalysable terms. And knowledge 
becomes impossible; for how can one apprehend things that are infinite in this way" 
(994b21). Infinity cannot be allowed into the system of essences, for "if the kinds of 
causes had been infinite in number, then also knowledge would have been impossible; 
for we think we know, only when we have ascertained the causes, but that which is 
infinite by addition cannot be gone through in a finite time" (994b27). The infinite, 
then, is representative of Aristotle's fear of indeterminacy, for it is by its nature 
indefinable and thus if his solution to the problem of indeterminacy and otherness is 
to include them within his scientific system, then, his treatment of the infinite will 
most severely test this theory, for it seems, least of all, compatible with any 
limitation. The question, essentially, is whether Aristotelian science can allow for the 
actuality of the unbounded, unformed infinite. If so, then something would remain 
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unexplained within Aristotle's ordered system (sys--whole, complete), despite its 
accounting for the indeterminacy of potentiality, monstrosity, matter and the 
accidental, and the system would no longer be total. Infinity is a linguistic term, and 
so it is definable, but its reference suggests something that cannot possibly be grasped 
by definitions; it suggests some(no)thing beyond the capacity of language. The 
infinite can never be a subject of discourse (and hence limited and graspable). It can 
never be seen in its totality and explained, for explanation requires a knowledge of 
limits and what is external to the thing, and limits can never be given to that which is 
itself the totality, to that which has no limits, for that would require going outside to 
where there is no outside. 
Aristotle's solution to the problem of the infinite is similar to his equivocal 
solution to the problem of change (Edel, 12). He places the infinite in potentiality 
and denies that it can have actual existence. The "infinite is a cause in the sense of 
matter," and therefore it exists potentially, but not "as a separate thing" (207b35-
208a7). It is never actual; it exists only as potential, but as a special kind of 
potentiality. "[T]he infinite does not exist potentially in the sense that it will ever 
actually have separate existence; it exists potentially only for knowledge" (1048b13). 
Although every potential is thought to be actualizable, what is actualized necessarily 
takes on some form and becomes determinate--limited--and thus the infinite by 
'definition' cannot become actualized. 
The infinite, for Aristotle, admits of no stripping of its qualities like the 
indeterminate and the other. In a sense, it can never fit into the determinate world, 
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for it is too big for it. "Complete actualization of the potential infinite is impossible" 
(Edel, 48). The infinite is never actualized because only some definite part of it may 
be generated. "Potentiality is always for something determinate" and the infinite (or 
unbounded) by definition cannot be determinate ( 44). But this discussion of the 
infinite is nonsensical, since it is never even strictly predicable of a subject, for that 
would constitute a limitation of the unlimited. Hence, "to speak of infinity is to 
misuse the concept" (55). Nevertheless, as with potential, the accidental, matter and 
the monstrous, Aristotle includes the infinite within the determinate not only in 
discourse but also as a concept with "meaning only within a finite whole" (ibid.). The 
infinite is seen as an inexhaustible process--for example, in a periodic function like 
the day. "Infinity only has meaning as the matter for certain changes or processes 
within it or any portion closed off within it" (ibid.). However, this is not to say that 
change can be infinite, for Aristotle argues 
"that no process of change is infinite: for every change, whether between 
contradictories or between contraries, is a change from something to 
something. Thus in contradictory changes the positive or the negative, as 
the case may be, is the limit, e.g. being is the limit of coming to be and 
not-being is the limit of ceasing to be . . . a process of change cannot be 
infinite in the sense that it is not defined by limits" (241a27-b12). 
All change is defined by limits, so all change is finite, except in the sense of a 
circular or periodic process. The universe as a whole is often considered the infinite, 
though the characterization of this as the infinite implies a certain conceptual ability to 
sum up the whole from outside. But for Aristotle, the whole cannot be viewed as 
unlimited. He "views the world as a whole as a determinate system" and thus the 
infinite, if it is present at all, must be inseparable from a determinate process (ibid.). 
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The infinite is used in a determinate fashion. This is a requirement of discourse. 
"Every subject is determinate, it is something, and as such, a possible subject of 
discourse. The concept of infinity implies as prior some determinate subject" (Edel, 
56). In discussing the infinite there is always the need of predicating it of a particular 
determinate subject ( 64). 
To speak of infinity requires that it be limited and this is also a requirement for 
its actualization. Aristotle agrees with Parmenides that the whole is limited (59). As 
such the totality is not infinite, and can be a subject of discourse. But the infinite 
cannot fit within this whole, and therefore it cannot be actualized. This 
characterization is necessary to exclude sheer indeterminacy from the rational 
world-system. The infinite cannot exist as such, for that would allow indeterminacy 
within the system. "[N]othing infinite can exist; and if it could, at least the notion of 
infinity is not infinite" (994b28). Thus, Aristotle does not even believe that the 
whole, the universe, is infinite or graspable as a whole, and he does not even allow 
for the unboundedness of the notion of infinity. As Simplicius says, "the determinate 
whole is finite. If, therefore, it were possible to take a greatest of determinates (i.e., 
the whole), what was taken would necessarily be indeterminate and infinite," (62-3) 
and so Aristotle allows only a limited and decidely determinate part of the infinite into 
his system. 
CHAPTER SIX--CONCLUSION 
Thus, Aristotle excludes indeterminacy from his system entirely, although it 
appears in a manner of speaking. In each case, he examines things as 
determinate--whether potentiality, the accidental, the monstrous, or the infinite--and 
finds a unity and being in all things that can be discussed. The other, in a limited 
form, is necessary for his system of change, and yet it is nonetheless an other that is 
determinate, that is one and that is not other in being. It is a matter for discourse. 
Whether there are levels of indeterminacy below discourse is unclear, in that Aristotle 
attempts to define everything from the lowest parts of animals to human feeling, and 
to ascribe to each a particular cause. Even spontaneous generation, in his limited 
understanding, is described scientifically, as a generation from soil or mud. 
Indeterminate things, this account suggests, are merely imperfectly understood. 
"Though Aristotle's language often gives the impression that the indeterminate or 
infinite is unknowable, he certainly does not seem to mean an Unknowable to which 
we can in some other way than by knowing somehow or other penetrate" (Edel, 71). 
The unknowable is excluded from his system, and, in fact, as matter and potential, 
the accidental and the infinite, the indeterminate becomes the very basis for his entire 
scientific system. 
The fact that things happen in unusual ways is true in a sense, but looked at in 
another way, nothing ever happens in an unusual way. A given efficient ca~se always 
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produces the same effect on matter of a sort, and the result is never other in species. 
"[I]t is a law of nature that the same cause, provided it remain in the same condition, 
always produces the same effect" (de Gen. et Corr.336a28); "a given germ does not 
give rise to any chance living being, nor spring from any chance one; but each germ 
springs from a definite parent and gives rise to a definite progeny" (Parts of Animals, 
641 b28) and even if this progeny is considered a monstrosity it is not other in species 
to its antecedent matter--it remains unified in some essential respect with its matter. 
This necessary form of causation suggests that if the totality of causes for events were 
known, then all events would be necessary and there would be no indeterminacy at 
all. Certain things appear accidental when looked at in a certain way, but this is 
caused not by the lack of purpose in the event, but, rather, by the inability to see a 
grand plan of the relations of all things, and of the relations of things within a natural 
object. Such a plan is absent from Aristotle's account of science, and this can be said 
to be the cause of any indeterminacy found in the system. A system of natural laws 
would better explain the relations between things, though it too would be forced to 
attempt a grounding of the simultaneous presence of indeterminacy and science. 
However, even without this grand plan the indeterminacy of the system 
disappears, for events are always seen, when examined directly, to happen according 
to nature or purpose. The problem for Aristotle is that when the accidental is seen as 
caused, it becomes necessary and the unity of a thing once again becomes 
problematic. In this discovery, which is not at all inconsistent with Aristotle's view of 
science, the identity of a thing is unveiled as a mental product and its 'real' unity is 
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dissolved. This is not as inconsistent with Aristotle as it seems, for he often relies on 
the qua or 'in a way' distinctions in order to make many of his points. The conceptual 
framework used in thinking an object and its qualities seems to determine whether a 
thing is one. As a result, the judgement of something as something becomes to some 
extent like Nietzsche's assertion of the identity of Homer, an aesthetic judgement. The 
characterization of something as matter, potential or accidental is a theoretical 
construct, a particular way of looking at something, and that thing has an essence that 
is given to it; it is not inherent in the thing. The accidental, the monstrous, matter and 
potential are all indeterminate if taken in a certain way, but determinate if taken in 
another way. They are theoretical constructs and the model used to describe them 
determines whether, like being, they can be inquired into. Characterizations of the 
system always depend on how one looks at a particular thing, but when examined 
directly the indeterminacy always seems to disappear. The disappearance of 
indeterminacy, however, is a fundamental problem for Aristotle. 
If indeterminacy is barred from his system, Aristotle's solution to Parmenides 
is thrown into doubt. The determinacy of the world-system suggests that Aristotle is 
not the pluralist that he claims to be. Aristotle argues that being is said in many 
senses. But he does not (and cannot) say that there are different kinds of being, and 
he founds from within a rigid limit between being and not-being, just as he limits 
from within the borders of the finite universe. There are many ways of looking at 
being and of speaking about it, but this does not mean that there are really different 
kinds of being. The indeterminacy of the potential, for example, is only one way of 
speaking about how beings change. Aristotle says that being is said in many senses 
but all refer to one central point, to one physis, "to one definite kind of thing" 
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( 1003a34). The unity of the senses of being is predicated on the fact that each sense 
refers to substance, to a definite kind of thing, and this seems to suggest that being is 
one and determinate. Everything refers to a de.finite kind of thing, and unity and order 
are characteristic of all things. 
Consequently, the basis for the disappearance of indeterminacy in the 
accidental, matter, monstrosity and potential becomes clear. Being itself is ordered 
and determinate. The determinacy of Aristotle's system is total, if examined in this 
direct way, and the characterization of Aristotle as a pluralist becomes somewhat 
problematic. As a scientist Aristotle wishes to explain every change in the world. This 
requires that there be some ultimate basis for science, some foundational order and 
unity that perdures throughout all its manifestations. The commonality of the senses of 
being provides this basis, for the senses of being all refer to one definite kind of 
thing. "There is one kind of being which is in the strictest and fullest sense--viz. 
substance; and all other things are simply by virtue of standing in some definite 
relation to substance" (Ross, 156). Indeed the idea that the various senses of being 
actually refer to different kinds of being, and not just to different ways of looking at 
the same thing, is cast into doubt. If, as Aristotle maintains, a unity is present in all 
the senses of being, then perhaps being is one. Thus, by emphasizing the universality 
of science and the oneness to which all the senses of being ref er, Aristotle becomes 
open to charges that he, like Parmenides, is a monist, though certainly his brand of 
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monism should not be conflated with that of Parmenides, for Aristotle does reduce all 
things to one substance. But there are several kinds of monism, as Aristotle himself 
notes, in the first few pages of the Metaphysics, and Aristotle's falls under this 
category because of its theoretical subsumption of all into the category of the limit, to 
order, and to unity, and because of its absolute exclusion of otherness and 
indeterminacy, taken radically, from the realm of being. 
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